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ABSTRACT
Three topics are discussed concerning the application probability and explanation to the
confirmation of theories. The first concerns the debate over prediction versus accommodation. I
argue that we typically have reason to be more confident of a theory given that it was constructed
independently of the knowledge of certain data than if it was designed to accommodate those
data. The second concerns the puzzle of the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the universe for life. I argue
that the fact that our universe meets the extremely improbable yet necessary conditions for life
provides no evidence for the thesis that there are, or have been, very many universes. The third
chapter concerns the need to explain the existence of life. I argue that if life's existence needs an
explanation at all, the place to look is in a teleological explanation. If this option is rejected, we
should be content to see the origin of life as an extremely improbable fluke.
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Title: Professor of Philosophy
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Chapter I: The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction
over Accommodation
I. Introduction
Should we have more confidence in a theory if it correctly predicted some data, than
if it was merely designed to accommodate that data? Many philosophers have
thought so, but have had difficulty explaining why, and defending their claim
against powerful objections. They have often reasoned roughly as follows. We are
rightly impressed by theories which not only fit the existing data, but lead to
predictions which are later confirmed. After all, it is not hard to cook up a theory to
account for known facts. But that our theory makes successful novel predictions,
seems to be a clear indicator that we are onto the truth, since it is unlikely that a
false theory would be so successful. 1
Recently however, a growing number of philosophers have argued that this
alleged epistemic difference is bogus.2 Their reasons are very roughly as follows.
What more could be relevant to assessing the truth of a theory than the content of
the theory and the data (and auxiliary assumptions and background theory), and the
relations between them? The order in which the theory was constructed and the
data discovered, and even the motivations of the theorist (whether the theory was
constructed with the data in mind) seem beside the point. Indeed it should make no
difference whether the theory was constructed at all, or just fell out of the sky. To
assess its truth we must simply consider its inherent plausibility and how it fits with
all the evidence we have.
1 Philosophers on this side of the debate include Leibniz (1969), Peirce (1931-58), Whewell (1860),
Duhem (1954), Geire (1983), Maher (1988), and Worrall (1989).
2 They include Mill (1843), Xeynes (1921), Horwich (1982), Schlesinger (1987), Howson and
Franklin (1991), and Achinstein (1994), and Collins (1994).
4
The issue is not only important in itself, but is connected to a number of
important issues in epistemology and philosophy of science. For instance, one
central argument for scientific realism claims that the predictive success of scientific
theories in general is significant evidence for their truth.3 I will make a case for a
version of predictionism, the view that in many circumstances, the fact that a theory
predicted, rather than accommodated certain data, provides support for the theory,
beyond that provided by the data itself. I will give an explanation of why prediction
has an epistemic advantage over accommodation, an explanation which allows us
to see which factors govern the degree of this advantage and the circumstances in
which it holds. I will begin by presenting what I take to be the most powerful
argument against predictionism, followed by an examination of the most common
argument for predictionism, and why it does not work. My defense of predictionism
will be in the same spirit as the standard one, but overcomes the anti-predictionist
objections. I will conclude with some suggested applications of this discussion to
debates over scientific realism.
II. Clarification of the Issues
First I should clarify my use of the expression "the data". 4 We will be concerned
with cases in which a theory T entails a certain proposition which, either before or
after the construction of T, is discovered to be true. But the mere fact that T entails a
known proposition is not remarkable by itself. For instance T entails the disjunction
(T or P), for any known proposition P (and (T or P) is known if P is known). So we
need some restriction on which entailed truths are relevant to confirmation. I will
3 Collins (1994) mentions a number of related issues, including Lakatos's account of scientific
methodology, according to which one research program can supersede another, only if it predicts new,
unforeseen phenomena, Popper's view of science as a form of knowledge superior to other explarnatory
enterprises such as history or psychoanalysis, and the legitimacy of the distinction, advocated by the
positivists, between the 'logic of discovery' and the 'logic of justification'.
4 Although it is not strictly correct usage, to avoid awkward phrases I will follow a common
practice of using "data" sometimes as a singular expression.
not address the interesting problem of giving a general account of the conditions in
which entailment of a truth counts as evidence for a theory. For our purposes we
can understand entailment of data as relative to a certain experiment, and
corresponding class of mutually exclusive possible outcomes. Relative to
experiment E, "the data", refers to that proposition which specifies the unique actual
outcome of E.
Second, we should get clear on just what the prediction/accommodation
distinction is. In a typical case of successful prediction, a theory is first constructed,
then tested by deducing some of its consequences, which are later discovered to be
true. In a case of accommodation the data is already known before the theory is
constructed. This might suggest that the crucial distinction concerns the temporal
order of theory construction and data discovery. But while some discussions have
focused on this distinction, it seems that what really matters is not temporal order,
but a causal relation. Intuitively, a theory is less well confirmed if it was designed to
entail certain data, i.e., the condition of entailing that data acted as a constraint on
the construction of the theory.5 Of course the reason why a theory was not designed
to entail the data is usually that the data was not known at the time. But if the data
was known, but the theory was not constructed with this data in mind, it seems that
it should support the theory in the same way and to the same extent as it would
have had it not been discovered until after the theory was constructed. The
following definitions capture the distinction which matters here.
A theory T accommodated D iff T entails D, D is true, and T was designed
to entail D, (i.e., the condition that the theory entail D acted as a constraint
on the selection of T as the accepted theory)6
5 This account of accommodation is close to what Zahar (1973) and Worrall (1985) call lack of
iheuristic novelty.
6 Of course, a theory rarely entails any specific data on its own, but only in conjunction with a set of
auxiliary assumptions and background theory. So entailment here should be understood as entailment
relative to a set of background assumptions. In comparisons between cases of prediction and
accommodation, these background assumptions should be kept fixed.
T correctly predicted D, iff T entails D, D is true, and T was not designed to
entail D.
We can now state the question which concerns us.
In what circumstances, if any, should the information that T correctly
predicted, rather than accommodated D, give us greater confidence in T?
It is useful to distinguish a weak and a strong version of predictionism:
Weak Predictionism: The fact that T correctly predicted rather than
accommodated D provides further evidence for T, if we are ignorant of
either the content of T or the independent evidence that supports it.
Strong Predictionism: The fact that T correctly predicted rather than
accommodated D, typically provides further evidence for T, even if we are
familiar with the content of T and the independent evidence that supports
it.
The weak thesis is not controversial. It is agreed on all sides that if we were to
survey all the actual theories that have been proposed, we should expect to find that,
on average, those theories from which successful predictions had been made would
be better supported by the total evidence, than those which have merely
accommodated existing data. There are at least a couple of reasons for this. First, as
Keynes (1921) pointed out, as a matter of practice, rarely is a theory tested by
deducing its consequences, unless it already has evidential support, whereas a
theory will often be proposed to accommodate existing data, even if it has little or no
independent support. Second, the accommodation of data often results in a clumsy,
ad hoc, and hence less simple theory, one which gives a less unified account of the
total evidence, especially in the case where an existing theory is modified to account
for new evidence. So theories which successfully predict data tend to be more
plausible, all things considered, than those that merely accommodate data, by virtue
of their greater simplicity.7
7 Lipton (1991) explores this phenomenon in some depth.
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As a consequence, information as to whether the data was predicted rather than
accommodated by the theory, can rationally increase our confidence in the theory, at
least in so far as we are ignorant of its degree of simplicity and the background
evidence that supports it. For in this case, learning that the data was predicted
should increase our confidence in the theory by virtue of increasing our estimate of
the theory's simplicity and independent evidential support. So Weak Predictionism
seems clearly correct. But in a situation where we are thoroughly familiar with the
content of the theory (and hence its degree of simplicity), and all the evidence
supporting it, we can assess its simplicity and evidential support first hand, and it
seems that our judgment should not be affected upon learning that the data was
predicted or accommodated. So Strong Predictionism is not supported by
considerations of simplicity and independent evidence.
The strong and weak predictionist theses are interesting for different reasons.
Most of the debate over prediction vs. accommodation has focused on the strong
thesis. This thesis is open to serious objections, and its opponents often suspect that
its popularity stems from a confusion with cases which only support Weak
Predictionism. While the weak thesis seems obviously correct, it is interesting and
useful to understand why prediction has an epistemic advantage in circumstances of
incomplete knowledge of the theory's content and independent evidence. My
account will both support Strong Predictionism and provide a new understanding
of why the weak thesis holds, one which goes beyond the standard explanations in
the literature. First I will consider what the defender of Strong Predictionism is up
against.
III. The Anti-predictionist Challenge
There are a number of reasons why the strong predictionist thesis seems highly
dubious, some involving analyses of individual cases, and others involving general
arguments. First, many of the cases which might be taken to illustrate the epistemic
advantage of prediction are either historically inaccurate, 8 or can be diagnosed as
involving some other factor, such as simplicity, which makes the epistemic
difference. When we are careful to construct a case which eliminates these other
differences, we often find that the epistemic advantage of prediction seems to
disappear. Suppose I watch a coin being tossed 50 times, landing heads every time.
After five heads, I tentatively form the hypothesis that the coin is double headed,
and correctly predict the remaining outcomes. You, on the other hand, learn of the
outcomes after the sequence is completed, and similarly conclude that the coin is
double headed. Surely I have no more reason to believe the hypothesis than you,
just because I made an early prediction. This case eliminates various independent
features which can make an epistemic difference (we both fully grasp the theory and
its evidence). It is tempting to generalize to the view that whenever we fully grasp
the theory and all the evidence, whether the data was predicted or accommodated
makes no epistemic difference. Second, a rather compelling case can be made against
Strong Predictionism, as we will see presently. And third, the standard and
seemingly compelling predictionist argument turns out to be flawed on closer
inspection; I will examine this argument in sections IV-V.
The following argument, based on Collins (1994), brings out just how
implausible the strong predictionist thesis can seem, on a certain way of looking at
it. Suppose we know that D is true and that T entails D. We are also thoroughly
familiar with the content of T and all the independent evidence supporting it. Our
question is whether on learning that T predicted rather than accommodated D, we
should revise our confidence in T. Note that the difference between accommodation
8 For example, Worrall (1989) challenges Geire's (1983) historical account of Fresnel's light
diffraction predictions and Brush (1994) challenges Maher's (1988) and Lipton's (1991) accounts of
Mendeleev's prediction of the elements, among many other cases.
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and prediction consists simply in the occurrence of a certain psychological process,
in those who developed the theory T, namely the process of designing the theory to
entail D. The answer to our question now hinges on whether the information that
this psychological process occurred, should have any affect on our confidence in T.
The problem is that there seems to be no plausible, non-mysterious way that the
fact that this psychological process took place in the theorist's head could be
epistemically relevant to the truth of her theory. One common circumstance in
which one state of affairs may provide evidence that another state of affairs obtains,
is when we have reason to suspect that there is some causal connection between the
two possible states of affairs. Could there be a causal connection between the truth of
the theory T and the theorist's not having designed T to entail certain data? Let T be
the theory of general relativity, which, as it happens, Einstein did not design to
entail the correct degree to which light bends around the sun (although it does in
fact entail it). The theory of general relativity is true just in case certain physical
states of affairs obtain, such as that space-time is curved to the degree given by the
field equations, and so on. But it can hardly be that the goings on in Einstein's head
are causally responsible for the structure of space-time. Nor does there seem to be a
causal connection in the other direction. The curvature of space-time could not
have caused Einstein not to design his theory to entail the correct degree of light
bending.
Now of course a causal connection is not the only possible basis for an evidential
connection between states of affairs. But in the present case it is hard to see what
other kind of evidential connection there might be. The predictionist therefore faces
the following challenge: explain how the fact that the psychological process of
designing the theory T to entail the data occurred, can, in some plausible and non-
mysterious way, rationally affect our confidence in T.
IV. The No-Coincidence Argument for Predictionism
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The third reason that I suggested the strong predictionist thesis seems dubious was
that the strongest argument in its favor is flawed. Let's now turn to consider this
argument, sometimes called the No-Coincidence Argument. The most common
line of argument for Strong Predictionism is some version of the following.9 If our
theory T correctly predicted D, a good explanation of this fact is that T is true, for the
truth of T guarantees the success of its predictions such as D. But if T is false, then it
is highly iunlikely to correctly predict data that we later discover; we should have to
say that its predictive success was a mere coincidence. The fact that the truth of T can
explain its predictive success, which would otherwise be a striking coincidence, is
significant evidence for T. However, if T merely accommodates D, we do not need to
invoke the truth of T to explain this fact. For if T was designed to entail D, it is no
surprise that it does so, regardless of whether T is true or false. So when we know
that T merely accommodated D, it does not gain this extra support.
The point is sometimes put in terms of two competing explanations for the fact
that T entails the data: (i) the truth hypothesis-that T is true, and (ii) the design
hypothesis-that T was designed to entail the data. If T predicted D, then the Truth
hypothesis is the only option and hence is confirmed. But if T merely
accommodated D, the design hypothesis is sufficient to explain the fact that T entails
the data, and hence it renders the Truth hypothesis otiose. Hence T is better
supported over all, given that it predicted rather than accommodated the data.10
V. Problems with the No-Coincidence Argument
9 Versions can be found it Peirce (1931-51), Whewell (1860), Geire (1983) and Worrall (1989).
Opponents of strong predictionism such as Keynes (1921), Horwich (1982), and Collins (1994) identify
this as the major motivation for predictionism. My diagnosis of the argument differs from theirs.
10 Another variation on the argument, found in Geire (1983) and Worrall (1989) is that prediction
has an epistemic advantage because only in the case of prediction does the experiment whose outcome is
specified by D, constitute a good test of T, i.e., one which has a good chance of falsifying T. The
underlying reasoning here is essentially the same. In a case of prediction, T is far more likely to pass
the test if it is true, than if it is false, whereas in a case of accommodation T is guaranteed to pass the
test. I will not discuss this version of the argument directly in what follows, but I believe that my
criticisms apply equally.
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I will argue in this section that no version of the No-Coincidence Argument is
successful. The argument involves a kind of inference to the best explanation, so it
will pay us to examine just what the explanans and explanandum are. Two possible
explanans appear in the argument: theory T's being true, and T's having been
designed to entail the data. The explanandum has to do with the entailment
relation between the theory and the data. Unfortunately, precisely what the
explanandum is taken to be varies among different versions of the argument, or in
many cases is just left unclear, so we will have to survey a number of alternatives.
(i) Taking our data to be D, our first candidate for the explanandum is
(E) The fact that T entails D
This however is a non-starter, since entailments are necessary; T would have
entailed D regardless of the truth of T, or how it was 'designed', or anything else for
that matter.
(ii) Perhaps a more promising suggestion is
(P) The fact that T correctly predicted D
This is at least a contingent fact, and hence open to explanation. Taking P as our
explanandum, the predictionist argument proceeds as follows. In a case of
prediction, P may be explained by the truth of T, and hence P confirms T's truth. But
in a case of accommodation, we have no such fact as P to explain; instead we have
(A) The fact that T accommodated D
And we do not need the truth of T to explain A. Indeed A needs no explanation,
since it is all too easy to get a theory to accommodate some data. Hence in a case of
prediction we have stronger confirmation for T.
But now note that the fact that T correctly predicted D is a conjunction of three
facts: that T entails D, that T was not designed to entail D, and that D is true. We
have just seen that T's entailing D is not open to explanation at all. As for the fact
that T was not designed to entail D, it seems rather implausible that this could be
12
explained by the truth of T. For example, the fact that general relativity is true, i.e.,
that space-time is curved and so on, does not explain the fact that Einstein did not
design his theory to entail the data that light bends around the sun. So it seems that
the truth of T can explain the fact that T correctly predicted D, only by explaining D's
being true. This it may well do, for since T entails D, the truth of T guarantees the
truth of D.
But precisely the same holds in the case where T merely accommodated D. T's
accommodating D consists in the fact that T entails D, T was designed to entail D,
and D is true. As with the case of prediction, the truth of T is irrelevant to the first
two conjuncts, but entails the third. If the truth of T explains T's correctly predicting
D, by virtue of entailing that D is true, then it seems it should also explain T's
accommodating D, for the same reason. So this approach fails to bring out a
difference between the weight of predicted and accommodated data.11
(iii) Suggestion (i) failed because entailments hold necessarily between
propositions, and 'T' and 'D' refer rigidly to certain propositions. Now of course
whatever proposition D is, T cannot help but entail that very proposition, but it
need not have entailed the data, where 'the data' is taken to refer non-rigidly to
whichever proposition describes the actual outcome of our experiment. Perhaps a
better way of putting it is that T might not have been data-entailing. So we might
take
(DE) The fact that T is data-entailing
as a good candidate for the explanandum. The predictionist argument would then
proceed as follows. In a case of prediction, the truth of T may explain DE, and hence
be confirmed by DE. But in a case of accommodation, DE is adequately explained by
11 This objection is based on Collins (1994).
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T's having been designed to entail the data, and hence the inference to T's truth is
undermined.
Now T's being true might well explain its being data-entailing, since necessarily,
the entailments of a true theory are true. The question is whether T's being designed
to entail the data offers a rival explanation. Here the word 'design' can be
misleading. We cannot design a theory to entail the data, in the sense that we design
a house to face the ocean, where that very house would not have faced the ocean
had we not designed it to. A theory is a proposition which cannot be molded into
shape to fit the data; it has its truth-conditions and hence entailments essentially. A
better metaphor for the process of theorizing is that of selecting a theory off the
platonic library shelf. Theories already exist, and necessarily entail what they do,
independently of our selection of one. To modify our current theory to fit the data is
really to discard it and select a slightly different one. To say that T was designed to
entail the data just means that T was selected under a certain restriction, namely
that the chosen theory entail whatever the data happens to be.
But now the fact that T was selected under this restriction does not help explain
the fact that it meets the restriction, any more than Jane's choosing to buy a house
that faces the ocean helps explain why it faces the ocean. That very house would
have faced the ocean regardless of Jane's criteria in choosing a house. Similarly, T is
data-entailing just in case the possible experimental outcome which T necessarily
entails, does in fact obtain. But of course which outcome obtains in no way depends
on the theorist's method of theory selection (the degree of light bending could
hardly be explained by the way that Einstein came up with general relativity). So in
the case of accommodation, T's having been designed to entail the data does not
serve as a rival to T's truth, as an explanation of T's entailing the data, for it does not
serve as an explanation of that fact at all.
VI. Introducing the Role of the Theorist
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We have considered three candidates for the role of explanandum in the No-
Coincidence Aigument, all of which fail to make the argument work. The following
suggestion goes beyond the standard No-Coincidence Argument, by focusing on the
theorist. I will argue that it will not save the No-Coincidence Argument, yet it
provides the basis for the successful argument presented in the next section.
Perhaps the temptation to suppose that T's being designed to entail the data
explains the fact that it does entail the data, is due to a confusion between this and
another fact, namely, that the theorist now holds a theory which entails the data.
This might be explained by her theory selection having been restricted to data-
entailing theories, just as the fact that Jane now inhabits a house which faces the
ocean can be explained by her having deliberately chosen one that does. So we
should consider
(ES) The fact that the theorist selected a data-entailing theory
as our explanandum. Let us call this fact the theorist's entailment-success. The
trouble here is that our preferred explanans, namely T's being true, does not explain
ES. A concrete example makes this clear. That general relativity is true, i.e., that
space-time is curved and so on, does not explain why Einstein came up with a
theory which makes true predictions. Einstein's success had more to do with his
epistemic relation to the facts, than with what those facts happened to be. It is
tempting to suppose that T's being true might help explain the theorist's
entailment-success by helping explain why the theorist holds T, since T's truth
guarantees that it is data-entailing. But T's truth can help explain the theorist's
holding of T, only if the theorist has some kind of propensity to hold true theories,
or at any rate, is in this situation 'reliably hooked up to the truth'. But if so, then the
fact that it is T which is true, is irrelevant to the theorist's predictive success. What
matters is just that she is reliably connected with the truth, i.e., she will tend to
accept the truth, regardless of whether the truth happens to be T. If, by contrast, the
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theorist's holding of T has no reliable connection with the facts, say, if it is just a
wild guess, then the lucky fact that she holds a data-entailing theory has nothing at
all to do with the truth of T. Either way, the truth of T is irrelevant when it comes to
explaining the theorist's entailment-success.
I will canvas one last attempt to take truth to explain the theorist's entailment-
success. Instead of taking the truth of T as our explanans, we might try the truth of
the theorist's theory, where 'the theorist's theory' is understood non-rigidly, or
better, the fact that the theorist holds a true theory. This has the advantage that it
does entail ES, that the theorist holds a data-entailing theory. But it does not seem to
explain it. That Jane owns a house facing the North Atlantic entails that she owns
an ocean-facing house, but it does not explain it. The explanation must have to do
with the way in which her house was chosen, for instance that she wanted a house
facing the North Atlantic and hence tried hard to get one.
In any case, whether or not we take the theorist's holding of a true theory to
explain her holding of a data-entailing theory, this does not help the predictionist's
case, since the inference to truth does not seem to be undermined by the design
hypothesis. If we do not know the location of Jane's house, our learning that it is
ocean-facing supports the hypothesis that it faces the North Atlantic (not because
either fact explains the other, but just because we have narrowed down the
possibilities, and all houses facing the North Atlantic face the ocean). But now the
information that Jane chose her house on the condition that it face the ocean, does
not diminish this support one iota. Similarly, the fact that the theorist holds a data-
entailing theory supports the hypothesis that she holds a true theory (not because
one fact explains the other, but just because we have narrowed down the
possibilities, and all true theories are data-entailing). But now why should we
suppose that the information that she chose her theory on the condition that it
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entails the data, diminishes this support at all? There is no obvious reason to
suppose that it does.
VII. A New Argument for Predictionism
All generous attempts to save the standard No-Coincidence Argument have failed. I
wish to present a new argument which is persuasive. We should still take
(ES) The fact that the theorist selected a data-entailing theory
as our explanandum. As we have noted, this might be explained by the design
hypothesis
(DS) The theorist designed her theory to entail the data, i.e., knowing the
data, she selected her theory on the condition that it entail this data.
What other hypothesis might explain ES? We might try to explain it by supposing
that she selected her theory on the condition that it was true, for this would
guarantee that she selected a data-entailing theory. But unfortunately, theories do
not come with clear labels attached declaring their truth-value, so they cannot be
straightforwardly selected by this criterion. Theory selection may, however, be more
or less well aimed at the truth. This notion requires further analysis, but it might
roughly be characterized as the degree to which the causal chain of mechanisms
which lead to her selection of the theory were reliably connected to the facts.
Obviously this is a matter of degree, but for the sake of simplicity we can focus on
the truth or falsity of the hypothesis
(RA) The theorist's selection of her theory was reliably aimed at the truth
by which I mean roughly that the mechanisms which led to her selection of a theory
gave her a good chance of arriving at the truth. This hypothesis at least raises the
theorist's chances of holding a data-entailing theory, by raising her chances of
holding a true theory. 12
12 Maher (1988) seems to be onto a similar idea, but develops it along different lines. For criticisms
of Maher's argument see Howson and Franklin (1991).
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VIII. The Archer Analogy
The relations among ES, DS and ILA can perhaps be illustrated by a simple analogy.
We may represent our theories and data on a map of logical space in which regions
on the map represent sets of possible worlds in which a proposition is true, the area
of a region being proportional to the probability of the proposition. The region D
represents our data, the outcome of a certain experiment. The small circular regions
represent theories which entail one of the experiment's possible outcomes. - Only
those which are sub-regions of D, entail the actual outcome, and only the region TR,
which contains the actual world, is true.
Now suppose that this map is drawn on the side of a barn and an archer shoots
an arrow at it. We do not know if the archer is aiming at TR or even how good his
aim is. Without seeing where the arrow landed, we are informed that it landed
18
I I
within a circle in region D. The question which concerns us is whether the arrow
landed in TR. The information that the arrow landed in D, should increase our
confidence that the arrow landed in TR, since TR is contained within D, and D is a
smaller region than the wall. (This is analogous to the way that learning that a
theory entails the data, can provide evidence that the theory is true, quite apart from
whether the data was predicted or accommodated).
But now consider how our confidence that the arrow landed in TR should differ
depending on whether we make the following assumption.
(DS*) The archer is reliably aiming at region D (he may or may not be
aiming more specifically at TR).
Whether or not we know this to be the case, will affect whether
(ES*) The fact that the arrow landed within D
supports
(RA*) The archer was reliably aiming at TR 13
Let's begin with the assumption that DS* is not true, indeed, let's suppose that the
archer couldn't have aimed at D, since it isn't even marked on the map (he still may
or may not have been aiming at TR). On this assumption, the fact ES*, that the
arrow landed in D, lends some support to the hypothesis RA*, that the archer was
reliably aiming at TR. For if he was reliably aiming at TR, he is more likely to hit it,
13 DS* and RA* should be understood to be logically independent. DS* says simply that the archer,
knowing the location of D, restricts his aim in such a way that he is guaranteed to hit somewhere
within D. He may or may not attempt to hit some more specific region such as TR. The denial of DS* is
consistent with his reliably aiming at TR. Of course in one sense, if the archer is aiming at TR, he must
also be aiming at D, since TR lies within D. But there is another sense-the one relevant to our
discussion--according to which the archer may aim at TR without aiming at D, i.e., without intending
to hit D, ii he does not even know where region D is, or at any rate, if his knowledge of the location of D
has no influence on how he shoots. Similarly with DS and RA, the theorist may design her theory to
entail the data with or without also reliably aiming for a true theory. And she may reliably aim at
the truth, without designing her theory to entail the data, if she does not know the data, or her
knowledge of the data plays no role in her selection of a theory.
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and hence hit D, since TR is a sub-region of D. He is far less likely to hit TR if he
wasn't reliably aiming at it, and hence less likely to hit D.
But on the assumption of DS*, he is guaranteed to hit D, regardless of whether
he is aiming more specifically at TR. So given DS*, RA* does not render ES* more
probable, and hence ES* provides no support for RA*. Hence the reliable aiming
theory is better supported by ES*, on the assumption that the archer did not aim at
region D. And this in turn renders it more probable that the arrow landed on TR,
given that the archer did not aim at D.
We can summarize the reasoning here as follows. Upon learning that the arrow
landed within D, we should increase our confidence that it landed on TR, since TR
lies within D and we have narrowed down the region in which it might have
landed. Upon learning that the archer was not restricting his aim to regions within
D, we have a further reason to suppose that it landed on TR. It is important here
that TR is not just any sub-region of D, but a salient target, one which stands out by
being painted black. We don't know if the archer is aiming at any small region or
how good his aim is, but if he is aiming, he is most likely to aim at TR, since it
stands out from the surrounding regions. The fact that the arrow landed within D
should increase our confidence that the archer was reliably aiming at TR (since his
aiming at TR would make him more likely to hit within D), and hence increase our
confidence that he hit TR. If, on the other hand, we learn that the archer restricted
his aim to regions within D, we have no grounds to further increase our confidence
in his aim at TR, or his hitting TR. For in this case his hitting within D is no further
indicator of his aim at TR (since he was bound to hit D, regardless of whether he was
aiming more specifically at TR).
The analogy should be clear. We can think of the process of theory selection as
like shooting an arrow at logical space, where we are uncertain as to how well the
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theorist is aiming at the truth, i.e., the reliability of the process by which she selected
her theory. The reliable aiming hypothesis,
(RA) The theorist's selection of her theory was reliably aimed at the truth
may be supported by the theorist's entailment-success, i.e.,
(ES) The fact that the theorist selected a data-entailing theory
But whether or not the theorist's entailment success supports the reliable aiming
hypothesis depends on the design assumption
(DS) The theorist designed her theory to entail the data
The analogy between DS* and DS is as follows. The archer, if he knows where
region D is, can restrict his aim to circles within this region, with or without aiming
more specifically at TR. Similarly, the theorist, if she knows the data, can restrict her
theory selection to theories which entail the data, with or without aiming more
specifically for the truth.
Now on the assumption of not-DS, the fact ES, supports the hypothesis RA. For
the theorist is more likely to select a true theory, given RA, and a true theory is
more likely to entail the data than a false one. But ES does not support RA on the
assumption DS. For on this assumption it is to be expected that she will select a data-
entailing theory, regardless of how well she wvas aiming at the truth. Hence the
reliable aiming hypothesis RA, is better supported by ES, on the assumption that the
theory was not designed to entail the data. And this in turn renders it more probable
that her theory is true, given that it was not designed to entail the data.
As with the archery analogy, we can summarize the reasoning here as follows.
Regardless of whether the theorist designed her theory to entail the data, upon
learning that her theory does entail the data, we should increase our confidence in
its truth, since necessarily, true theories are data-entailing, and we have narrowed
down the region of logical space in which the theory is contained. But now upon
learning that the theorist did not restrict her theory selection to data-entailing
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theories, we have a further reason to suppose that she selected a true theory. Here it
is important that the truth is a salient target. We don't know if the process of theory
selection was directed toward any specific kind of theory, but insofar as it was, it is
most likely to have been directed toward the truth (it would be odd for the theorist
to try to construct a specific kind of false theory). The fact that a data-entailing theory
was selected, should increase our confidence that the theorist was reliably aiming at
the truth (since her aiming at the truth would make her more likely to select a data-
entailing theory), and hence increase our confidence that she selected a true theory.
If, on the other hand, we learn that the theorist restricted her theory selection to
data-entailing theories, we have no grounds to further increase our confidence in
her aim at the truth, or her selection of a true theory. For in this case her selection of
a data-entailing theory is no further indicator of her aim at the truth (since she was
bound to come up with a data-entailing theory, regardless of how well she was
aiming at the truth).
IX. The Lottery Prediction Example
The way that this works can best be illustrated with a case in which the data D
provides little or no evidence for the theory T, where T merely accommodates D.
Compare the following two cases:
Accommodation: We read in the paper that Jane won the national lottery.
Fred proposes the following theory to explain this fact: the lottery was
rigged in Jane's favor.
Prediction: Before the lottery is even drawn, Fred proposes the theory that
it is rigged in Jane's favor. We later discover that Jane won.
In the second case we are far more inclined to believe Fred's theory than in the first.
In the second case we suspect that he must have been onto something, that he must
have had some kind of reliable access to the facts concerning the lottery setup, to
have been able to predict the lottery's outcome.
First let's look briefly at why the data
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(D) Jane won
does not render the theory
(T) The lottery was rigged in Jane's favor
very probable. While T does entail D, it does so only at the expense of being highly
implausible. T, we might say, inherits the arbitrariness of D, for even if the lottery
was rigged, we have no more reason to suppose that it would be rigged in Jane's
favor, than we have to suppose that Jane would win just by chance. Indeed the fact
that Jane won never called for an explanation in the first place; someone had to win,
and it could just as easily be Jane, as anyone. In Bayesian terms, we can note that
there is a weaker theory T*, which states simply that the lottery was rigged, which is
not confirmed one iota by Jane's winning, since Jane is no more likely to win given
that the lottery was rigged. But now since T entails T*, T can be no more probable
than T*. That is, Jane's winning renders the hypothesis that the lottery was rigged in
Jane's favor no more probable than that the lottery was rigged at all.
But there is something else which we might want to explain, apart from Jane's
winning, namely Fred's holding of a theory which entails her winning. Or rather,
Fred's holding of a theory which entails the actual outcome of the lottery, (his
holding a theory that entails Jane's winning is significant only if Jane was the actual
winner). The question that strikes us is, out of all the possible theories concerning
the mechanics of the lottery, how did Fred manage to get one into his head which
happens to entail the actual lottery result? Now of course in the accommodation
case, the answer is straightforward. Since Fred knew that Jane won, he could select
his theory under the constraint that it must entail this outcome. Apart from this
constraint, his theory construction need not have been aimed at the truth, it may
have been just a wild speculation.
In the prediction case, Fred did not select his theory under the constraint that it
entail the data, so we need a different explanation. The natural hypothesis that
23
comes to mind is that Fred was somehow reliably hooked up to the facts. On this
assumption, he is far more likely to come up with a theory which entails the actual
outcome. It would be an extraordinary fluke, if he just guessed a theory which
entailed the actual outcome. So in the case where Fred's theory predicts the data, we
have reason to suppose he was reliably hooked up to the facts, which in turn gives
us reason to suppose that he is right.
X. Meeting the Anti-predictionist Challenge
We are now in a position to see how the new account avoids the problems of the
standard No-Coincidence Argument and meets the anti-predictionist challenge.
Recall that in the standard No-Coincidence Argument the truth of T was supposed
to be supported by some kind of data-entailment fact, but this support was
undermined by a rival explanatory hypothesis, that the theory was designed to
entail the data. We have seen that there is no way of interpreting the argument to
make it work. On our new account, we have two potential explanatory hypotheses
for the fact that the theorist chose a theory which entails the data: the design
hypothesis DS, and the reliable aim hypothesis RA. Clearly the design hypothesis
does render the reliable aiming hypothesis otiose, at least with respect to explaining
the theorist's entailment-success. For what we have here are two causal hypotheses
concerning the process by which the theory was selected, each of which potentially
explains the result of the selection. This is a case of causal preemption. Perhaps the
theorist's process of theory selection had a good chance of producing a true, and
hence data-entailing theory. But in a case of accommodation, this causal explanation
is preempted by the fact that non-data-entailing theories were not even open to
selection. The fact that, knowing the data, the theorist restricted her theory selection
to data-entailing theories guarantees that she would select a data-entailing theory,
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and no further hypothesis regarding her aim at truth is necessary to explain her
doing so.
We can now see the plausible non-mysterious way that information concerning
a certain psychological process in the theorist's head, namely designing her theory to
entail certain data, is epistemically relevant to the truth of her theory. This
information, DS, is relevant in that it screens off the confirmation of the hypothesis
that the theory was reliably selected, by the fact that the theory entails the data. In
doing so, it diminishes the support that the theorist's entailment-success provides
for her theory.
A very simply Bayesian analysis brings this out, by comparing the relation
between ES and RA, first on the assumption of -DS, and then assuming DS.
P(ES I RA & -DS) > P(ES I -DS)
and so, P(RA I ES & -DS) > P(RA I ~DS) (1)
i.e., relative to -DS, ES confirms RA. However,
P(ES I RA & DS) = P(ES I DS)
and so, P(RA I ES & DS) = P(RA I DS) (2)
i.e., relative to DS, ES and RA are independent. So DS screens off the support that ES
provides to RA. Furthermore, adding the assumption that
P(RA I DS) < P(RA I -DS) (3)
i.e., without knowing whether the theorist holds a data-entailing theory, her
designing her theory to entail the data, makes it no more likely that her theorizing
was reliably aimed at the truth, it follows from (1)-(3) that
P(RA I ES & -DS) > P(RA I ES & DS)
i.e., given the theorist's entailment-success, her having designed her theory to entail
the data, renders it less probable that her theorizing was reliably aimed at the truth,
and hence less probable that her theory is true, which is the thesis of Strong
Predictionism.
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XI. The Degree and Circumstances of the Epistemic Advantage of Prediction
Granted that the successful prediction of data can, in principle, have an epistemic
advantage over the accommodation of that data, it remains to be seen in what range
of circumstances this holds and to what degree. In particular, we should address a
certain worry, namely that I have shown only that the weak predictionist thesis is
true (which was never in dispute anyway) but not the strong thesis. Recall that
according to Strong Predictionism, the fact that T correctly predicted rather than
accommodated D, typically provides further evidence for T, even if we are familiar
with the content of T and all the background evidence supporting it. Now according
to the new account, information that data was predicted by a theory, can rationally
affect our confidence in the theory, by indicating something about how well the
process of theory selection was aimed at the truth. But this theory selection process
just consists in the evaluation of evidence. So it might seem that in a case where we
know what the theorist's evidence is, we can see for ourselves how well her
theorizing was aimed at the truth, and hence any other indications of her aim, such
as whether she designed her theory to entail the data, will be irrelevant.
In response, it must be granted that our knowledge of the theorist's evidence
diminishes the relevance of whether her theory predicted or accommodated the
data. For knowing what evidence she had to go on gives us at least a good indication
of how well her theorizing was aimed at the truth. The crucial question is whether
knowledge of the theorist's evidence, entirely screens off the relevance of further
information concerning her theory selection process, such as whether certain data
was predicted or accommodated.
It seems clear that knowledge of the theorist's evidence does not entirely screen
off the relevance of this further information. For while information concerning the
evidence that the theorist had to go on is very relevant to how reliably her
theorizing was aimed at the truth, it does not settle the matter. It is useful here to
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consider two important factors linking evidence and theory. First, there are certain a
priori epistemic constraints on how evidence should be assessed in forming
theories. We might think of this in terms of a range of degrees of confidence that an
ideal epistemic agent might have in a theory, given a body of evidence (how wide
this range is, i.e., how tight the a priori epistemic constraints are, is an open
question). Second, there are various causal relations which are not knowable a
priori: these include the actual reliability of our perceptual faculties, the
trustworthiness of various sources, and the accuracy of our measuring instruments.
The crucial point here is that the degree of reliable aim of theorizing depends on
both factors, neither of which is entirely transparent to us.
Concerning the first, since we are not ideal epistemic agents, we are fallible in
our assessment of evidence. For instance, construction of a theory might involve
complex mathematical derivations where there is plenty of opportunity for errors,
even if we double check our work. In some cases, the inference from evidence to
theory involves intuitive judgments, the principles of which are not easy to
identify. A particularly striking case of this is our ability to "read" a person's facial
expressions, even though we cannot easily say how we interpret the visual cues on
which our judgments are based. We have no trouble forming such judgments, but
the degree to which the visual evidence supports our theory may be in doubt, and
no amount of double checking our inference can help us.
Suppose now the theorist comes up with theory T via complex derivations and
intuitive inferences from a multifarious collection of background evidence E. T
entails D, a possible outcome of a crucial experiment. Upon later discovering that D
is true, we have reason to increase our confidence in her assessment of the evidence
E. For if her assessment of the evidence was well attuned to the actual degree of
epistemic support between the evidence and the various candidate theories, she had
a better chance of hitting upon a true, and hence data-entailing theory. Suppose on
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the other hand, that knowing the data in advance, she narrowed down the pool of
candidate theories, by eliminating those which do not entail the data, and then
applied the mathematical techniques and intuitive judgments to select among this
narrower pool, in the light of background evidence E. In this case it is no surprise
that the resulting theory entails the data, and hence we have no further grounds for
confidence in her assessment of the evidence.
Similar points apply to the various causal relations which the process of theory
selection involves. For instance in choosing theories we often rely on the use of
measuring instruments, opinion of experts, and our own perceptual faculties, the
reliability of which is open to question. That the theorist came up with a data-
entailing theory may indicate that such causal connections were indeed reliable, but
only if her theory selection process did not involve narrowing down the candidate
theories in the light of the known data. For as before, if the measuring devices,
opinions of colleagues and so on, did not lead to theory T on their own, but only
when various non-data-entailing theories were deliberately eliminated, it is no
surprise that the selected theory entails the data, and hence the theorist's
entailment-success would be no indication of the reliability of these devices.
So Strong Predictionism is vindicated. Even if we know all the evidence on
which the theorist based her theory, the fact that certain data was predicted rather
than accommodated, may provide further evidence for the theory. When it comes
to our actual theoretical practices however, the strong thesis is not particularly
relevant, since we typically do not know all the evidence on which a theory was
based. The multifarious considerations which lead to the acceptance of a theory are
often too subtle and complex to be easily communicated. Indeed, even in our o w n
case, we do not typically keep careful track of all the reasons we ever had for
adopting a certain theory. We might come to question just how good all our reasons
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were, in which case further predictive success of our theory can suggest that our
reasons were not bad at all.
The degree to which prediction has an epistemic advantage over accommodation
can be seen now to depend on how well we understand the process by which the
theory in question was selected, and the bearing of the new predicted or
accommodated data. In some cases certain data might provide overwhelming
support for the theory by itself, even if we know nothing of the independent
evidence, and hence whether the data was predicted or accommodated can make
little difference. The coin's landing heads 50 times for instance, was all the evidence
we ever needed to conclude that it is double-headed; whether these landings were
predicted or accommodated can make little further difference. In other cases the new
data may be less than conclusive, but we have a very firm grip on the other factors
which led to the theory's acceptance, and hence learning that the data was predicted
will affect our estimation of the reliability of the process of theorizing only to a
negligible degree. It is in cases where the new data provides less than conclusive
support for the theory, and we have either limited knowledge of the background
evidence, or limited abilities in assessing it, that the information that the data was
predicted, rather than accommodated is most significant.
XII. The No-Miracles Argument for Scientific Realism
I will conclude with some very general suggestions as to how my account of the
epistemic advantage of prediction might be applied to a defense of scientific
realism. 14 Those who believe that our current scientific theories are true, or at least
14 The term 'scientific realism' is used to refer to a number of related theses. The one that I am
focusing on here is that our current scientific theories are true (or at least approximately true-I will
ignore this qualification since nothing in our discussion hinges cn it). The kind of antirealist I have in
mind is one who, like van Fraassen (1980) is happy that our theories 'save the phenomena', i.e., they
entail the (observational) data, but remains agnostic as to which of the many theories which do so, are
true.
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approximately true, must face the fact that no matter how much data we have
supporting a theory, there are numerous alternative theories which entail the same
data. The challenge for the realist is explain why some theories are more likely to be
true than the many other theories which entail the same data. One response to the
challenge is to appeal to further principles of confirmation; for instance, it might be
argued that some theories provide a better explanation of the data than others,
where the criterion for a good explanation goes well beyond mere entailment of
data. But there is an independent argument, which claims, in Putnam's (1975)
words, that scientific realism "is the only philosophy which doesn't make the
success of science a miracle." (p. 73) It would be a miracle, it is sometimes suggested,
that an airplane should fly me safely home to Sydney if the aerodynamical theories
on which its design is based were not true. Airplane flight is a tricky business. Of
course it is possible for a wildly false theory to entail the correct results-but why
would any sane person get in a plane if she didn't think the theories on which its
design was based were close enough to correct?
The No-Miracles Argument involves an inference to the best explanation of the
success of science, where this success just consists in the fact that our theories en tail
the data concerning say, airplane behavior. The claim is that the truth of this theory
can explain its success, which seems fair enough, since necessarily, truths entail
truths. But let's consider what this entailment of data consists in. If we let D specify
the airplane behavior that our theory T entails, then since T necessarily entails D, T
is data-entailing if and only if D is the data, i.e., D describes the actual airplane
behavior. So to explain the fact that T is successful, i.e., it entails the data, is just to
explain this data. But now there is something odd about the idea that truth could
play some explanatory role, over and above the physical facts which obtain, if our
theories are true. If anything explains the fact that airplanes stay up, it is (roughly)
that the pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure
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on its overside. There is no further explanation to be found by appealing to its being
true that the pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the
pressure on its overside. 15 The appeal to truth seems superfluous, and hence this
line of argument carries no more force than just the appeal to the explanatory
strength of some theories over others. 16
Indeed, the appeal to truth seems to carry less force against the antirealist
challenge. The challenge is to say why we should believe theory T, over a rival T',
which entails the very same data. If what is to be explained is the success of T, i.e.,
the fact that it entails certain data, then by hypothesis, T and T' are on a par in this
respect. If the hypothesis that T is true can explain why it entails the data, why can't
the truth of T' explain its success just as well? At least if we appeal to the specific
structure of T, we have some hope of showing that it has some explanatory
advantage over T'. But if we simply appeal to the truth of a theory, we have not
really discriminated amongst the theories which entail the same data.
XIII. Reconstructing the No-Miracles Argument
So the No-Miracles Argument is not very satisfactory as it stands. Nevertheless, it
carries considerable intuitive force. Perhaps we can reconstruct it along more
promising lines, following my explanation of the epistemic advantage of prediction.
Note that the No-Miracles Argument assumes, at least implicitly, that successful
predictions have a special epistemic status. 17  For if our theories simply
accommodated masses of data collected about airplane flight (suppose we never
designed planes, but Martians gave them to us long before we could grasp
aerodynamic theory) the argument would have much less bite. For what then
15 The example is adapted from Levin (1984), who uses it to make a somewhat different point.
16 This does not depend on a controversial deflationary account of truth, but merely that the
propositions that it is true that P and that P, are known to be necessarily equivalent, and hence one
cannot explain any more than the other does.
17 Leplin (1984) is one proponent of the argument who is explicit about it.
31
would be the miracle? Our theories would entail the data because we made sure
they do. And, the antirealist will be quick to add, there are plenty of other theories
we are free to choose from which likewise entail the data.
The key to reconstructing the No-Miracles Argument is to see that what needs to
be explained is not just the fact that our aerodynamical theories entail that airplanes
stay up, or that airplanes do stay up, but that scientists have managed to hit upon
theories which entail that they do, and in general, that they have hit upon theories
which are remarkably successful in a variety of practical applications. This would be
a miracle, if there were no explanation for it, and an obvious candidate explanation
is that the methods of science tend to get at the truth. This line of argument has at
least the potential to meet the antirealist challenge, because it does discriminate
between the rival data-entailing theories. T and T' may both entail the same data,
but it is by choosing T that the scientist managed to successfully predict the data, and
if her doing so suggests that her theorizing was aimed at the truth, this will support
T over T'.
XIV. Limitations of the Reconstructed No-Miracles Argument
The most serious difficulty that the reconstructed No-Miracles Argument faces is
the threat of a rival explanation of scientists' success at hitting upon theories which
accurately predict the data. Perhaps it can be argued that the methods of science have
a tendency to get at data-entailing theories, without having the more specific
tendency to get at the truth. Of course, scientists cannot straightforwardly select their
theories to entail all the data, since a fair amount of the data is not known when the
theory is chosen (it is their predictions, not accommodations which need
explaining). Still, there might be some indirect means by which the process of
scientific theorizing tends toward data-entailing theories, without tending more
specifically toward the truth.
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In connection with this idea, it is worth considering the neo-Darwinian response
which van Fraassen (1980) makes to the No-Miracles Argument:
The success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not even surprising to the
scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition,
a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive (p. 40)
The force of this objection depends on how we construe the argument against which
it is directed. Against the standard No-Miracles Argument, it carries no force at all.
The fact that unsuccessful theories are selected against, may explain why no such
theories are currently held, i.e., that all currently held theories are successful. But it
does not explain why those very theories are successful. (Compare: the fact that pens
which do not work are quickly discarded, explains why no such pens are owned, i.e.,
that all owned pens work. But it does not explain why those very pens work). There
remains the question, for each currently accepted theory, why it entails the data.
And a potential explanation for this fact is that the theory is true (even though, as
we have seen, this does not by itself meet the antirealist challenge).
Something like van Fraassen's response, however, might seem to undermine
the reconstructed version of the No-Miracles Argument. For here the explanandum
is the fact that scientists happen to hold successful theories. And it looks as though
we can explain this fact by noting that unsuccessful theories are quickly discarded.
But here we need to be careful. What we need to explain is not just that scientists
currently hold only successful theories, i.e., that they hold no unsuccessful
ones-this would be the case if they held no theories at all. We also want to explain
why they hold some successful theories. The fact that Jane drives only reliable used
cars might be explained by her policy of getting rid of cars that don't work. But we
might still wonder how she managed to get a reliable used car at all, since (let's
suppose) the vast majority of used cars on the market are lemons. The answer
might lie in her skill in checking the engine, transmission, etc., and hence being able
to pick a good car from a bad one.
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Recall the striking fact that Fred came up with a successful theory concerning the
rigging of the lottery. Of course, if Jane had not won, then Fred's theory that the
lottery was rigged in her favor would have been quickly discarded. But the fact that
Fred currently, holds a successful theory, is hardly explained away by the fact that if it
hadn't been successful, then Fred wouldn't still hold it. We are still struck by the fact
that he managed to come up with a successful theory in the first place. To take the
Darwinian analogy seriously, it would be a miracle if a single mutation produced an
entirely new complex organism perfectly adapted to its environment. We could not
dispel its amazingness by noting that if the organism hadn't turned out just the way
it did, it would not have survived for long.
What is required to dispel the miracle, is a vast plenitude of such mutations,
most of which are selected against. The multiplicity of mutations explains why there
are some 'successful' organisms, while the selection explains why there are only
successful ones. Perhaps if Fred had been in the habit of proposing lottery rigging
theories every day for years, we should find it less remarkable that he managed to
come up with a successful one eventually (similarly, perhaps Jane's success in
picking reliable used cars has nothing to do with expertise, but rather her policy of
buying dozens of cars, and ditching them as soon as they stop working). The
multiplicity of Fred's attempted theories would not explain why, in the case of Jane's
lottery he managed to hit upon a successful theory. Here there may be no
explanation at all, i.e., he was just lucky. But they would make his success less
surprising, and hence less in need of an explanation in terms of his reliable
connection to the truth.18
So we at least get a glimpse at how we might render it non-miraculous that
scientists manage to come up with theories which are marvelously successful in
18 I discuss the phenomenon of reduction of surprisingness by appeal to a multiplicity of events in
Chapter 2 of my dissertation, and in White (forthcoming), which constitutes Chapter 3.
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applications such as aeronautics. Very roughly, it might be a matter of trial and
error. Plenty of dud theories are suggested and rejected when they fail, rendering it
unremarkable that scientists currently hold successful ones. There are two
components to the explanation, as there are two facts to explain:
(S1) Scientists currently hold some successful theories
(S2) Scientists currently hold only successful theories
Van Fraassen's point about the harsh environment into which theories are born
explains S2, while the multiple attempts at successful theories explains S1.
This mere glimpse however, is insufficient to base any conclusions on. A
thorough analysis would require us to look at many factors, such as just how
remarkable the successes of science are and how common the failures. What I hope
to have done in the preceding discussion is clarify the nature of the debate, and
point the way to further research. As matters stand, we need to explain, or at least
render non-miraculous, the fact that scientists manage to come up with successful
theories. An explanation might lie in the mechanisms of theory selection being
directed toward the truth, and the acceptance of such an explanation should increase
our confidence in the truth of scientific theories in general. But this explanation
threatens to be undercut by the suggestion that the mechanisms of theory selection
are directed toward data-entailing theories, without being more specifically directed
toward the truth. Progress on this matter lies in fleshing out both possible
explanations by a careful analysis of the actual processes of scientific theorizing, and
weighing their plausibility.
References
Achinstein, Peter (1994) "Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight",
D. Hull, M Forbes, and R. M. Burian (eds.) PSA Vol. 2, East Lansing, Mich.:
Philosophy of Science Association, 156-64.
35
Brush, Stephen (1994) "Dynamics of Theory Change: The Role of Predictions", D.
Hull, M Forbes, and R. M. Burian (eds.) PSA Vol. 2, East Lansing, Mich.:
Philosophy of Science Association, 133-145.
Collins, Robin (1994) "Against the Epistemic Value of Prediction over
Accommodation", Nodis 28 (2):210-224.
Duhem, (1956) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Giere, Ronald N. (1983) "Testing Theoretical Hypotheses", in J. Earman (ed.)
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. X, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, pp. 269-98.
Keynes, John Maynard (1921) A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan.
Leibniz, G. W. (1969) Philosophical Papers and Letters, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Leplin Jarrett (1984) "Truth and Scientific Progress", in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific
Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Levin (1984) "What Kind of Explanation is Truth?" in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific
Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lipton, Peter (1991) Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge.
Horwich, Paul (1982) Probability and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Howson, Colin and Franklin A. (1991) "Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism",
Philosophy of Science 58: 574-585.
Maher, Patrick (1988) "Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery", A.
Fine and J. Leplin (eds.),PSA Vol. 1, East Lansing Mich.: Philosophy of Science
Association, pp. 273-285.
Mill. J. S. (1904) A System of Logic, London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Peirce, C. S. (1931-51) The Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, C. Hartshorne
and P. Weiss (eds.), Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1975) Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Schlesinger, George N. (1987) "Accommodation and Prediction", Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 65 (1): 28-42.
Whewell, William (1860) Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,
White, Roger (forthcoming) "Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes", forthcoming in
No il s
Worrall, John (1985) "Scientific Discovery and Theory Confirmation", in Joseph C.
Pitt (ed.), Change and Progress in Modern Science, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 301-31.
36
(1989) "Fresnel, Poisson and the White Spot: The Role of Successful
Predictions in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories", in D. Gooding et. al., Th e
Uses of Experiment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135-57.
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zahar, Elie (1973) "Why did Einstein's Programme Supercede Lorentz's? (I)", British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24: 95-123.
37
Chapter II: Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes
I. Introduction
John Leslie (1989) argues vigorously that the fact that our universe meets the extremely
improbable yet necessary conditions for the evolution of life, supports the thesis that
there exist very many universes. The view has found favor with a number of
philosophers such as Derek Parfit (1998), J. J. C. Smart (1989) and Peter van Inwagen
(1993).1 My purpose is to argue that this is a mistake. First let me set out the issue in
more detail.
The universe is said to be extraordinarily 'fine-tuned' for life. The inhabitability of
our universe depends on the precise adjustment of what seem to be arbitrary,
contingent features. Had the boundary conditions in the initial seconds of the big bang,
and the values of various fundamental constants differed ever so slightly we would not
have had anything like a stable universe in which life could evolve. In the space of
possible outcomes of a big bang, only the tiniest region consists of universes capable of
sustaining life. Most either last only a few seconds, or contain no stable elements or
consist of nothing but black holes. This is a fairly standard story told by
cosmologists-there is some controversy, concerning for instance the appropriate
measure on the space of possible outcomes-but I will assume it is the right picture for
the purpose of this discussion.2 The situation is thought to be something like the
following. Nuclear bombs are connected to a high security combination lock, such that
dozens of dials have to be adjusted with extreme precision to avoid detonating the
bombs. Had any one dial differed ever so slightly from its actual position, the world
would have been destroyed. In the absence of an explanation of why the dials were
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adjusted as they were (suppose they had been spun at random) we would find it
astonishing that we were here to consider the matter.
In response to this seemingly remarkable state of affairs, philosophers and physicists
have suggested various hypotheses involving multiple universes. By 'universe' I do not
mean possible world. Rather, according the multiple universe theories, the actual world
consists of very many large, more or less isolated sub-regions (universes) either
coexisting, or forming a long temporal sequence. The crucial feature of the various
Multiple Universe theories, is that those physical parameters which on which
inhabitability depends, are understood to be assigned randomly for each universe.3
How are multiple universes relevant to the puzzle? The basic idea is
straightforward. For any improbable outcome of a trial (e.g. dealing a royal flush,
hitting a hole in one, throwing a bull's eye) if you repeat the trial enough times you can
expect to get an outcome of that type eventually. If we suppose that our universe is just
one of very many universes, randomly varying in their, initial conditions and
fundamental constants, it is to be expected that at least one of them is life-permitting.
Add to this the fact that we could only find ourselves in a life-permitting universe and
we seem to have satisfyingly accounted for what at first seemed amazing, removing the
temptation to suppose that there was a Fine-Tuner, who adjusted the physical constants
for a purpose. It is widely thought therefore, that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned
for life, provides evidence for the Multiple Universe theory. In fact almost everyone
who has written on the topic accepts that the fine-tuning facts count in favor of multiple
universes, even if they are not persuaded that there are other universes.4 But they are
mistaken, or so I will argue. Perhaps there is independent evidence for the existence of
many universes. But the fact that our universe is fine-tuned gives us no further reason
to suppose that there are universes other than ours. I will examine the two main lines of




The first strategy takes a probabilistic approach to confirmation, according to which
confirmation is raising of probability. That is,
Evidence E confirms hypothesis H, given background knowledge K, if and only if
P(H IE & K)> P(H I K)
A probabilistic understanding of confirmation supports the use of the common sense
principle that, as Leslie (1989) puts it, "observations improve your reasons for accepting
some hypothesis when its truth would have made those observations more likely." (p.
121) A theorem of the probability calculus which underlies this principle is
P1: P(H IE & K) > P(H I K) " P(E I H & K) > P(E 1 -H & K)
A related theorem which will prove useful is
P2: P(H IE & K) = P(H I K) "- P(E IH & K) = P(E I -H & K)
In applications of probability to confirmation, controversy often arises concerning the
assignment of prior probabilities. How are we to determine the probability of M, that
there are many universes, prior to the fine tuning evidence E? One possible reason for
concern is that if P(M I K) is extremely low, then P(M I E & K) might not be much higher,
even if P(E IM & K) is much higher than P(E I -M & K). This need not concern us
however, for the question at hand is whether E provides any support for M at all. We
may grant, for the sake of argument, that the Multiple Universe hypothesis has a non-
negligible prior probability, or is even quite probable. Principles P1 and P2 give us a
handy test for whether the fine tuning evidence E provides any evidence for M: it does
so if and only if, E is more likely given M than given its denial.
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Now the appealing idea here is that a single life-permitting universe is exceedingly
improbable, but if we suppose there are or have been very many universes, it is to be
expected that eventually a life-permitting one will show up, just as if you throw a pair
of dice long enough you can expect to get a double six sometime (you cannot, of course,
expect it on any particular throw). It is tempting then to suppose that the fine-tuning
evidence confirms the Multiple Universe theory by P1, since the latter raises the
probability of the former.
But here we need to be clear about what our evidence is. For simplicity, let us
suppose that we can partition the space of possible outcomes of a big bang into a finite
set of equally probable configurations of initial conditions and fundamental constants:
fT1, T2,..., Tn) (think of the universes as n-sided dice, for a very large n).5 Let the
variable 'x' range over the actual universes. Let a be our universe6 and let T1 be the
configuration which is necessary to permit life to evolve. Each universe instantiates a
unique Ti, i.e., (Vx)(3!i)Tix. Let m be the number of universes that actually exist, and let
E = T a = a is life-permitting
E' = (3x)Tlx = Some universe is life-permitting
M = m is large (the Multiple Universe hypothesis)
It is important to distinguish E from the weaker E '. For while E' is more probable given
M than it is given -M, M has no effect on the probability of E. First let's consider E': In
general,
P((3x)Tix I m=k) = 1- (1 - 1/n)k for any i7
so P((3x)Tixl M) > P((3x)Tix I -M) for any i
so P((3x)Tlx I M) > P((3x)Tlx I -M)
i.e., P(E'I M) > P(E' I -M)
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E, on the other hand, is just the claim that a instantiates T1, and the probability of this is
just 1/n, regardless of how many other universes there are, since oa's initial conditions
and constants are selected randomly from a set of n equally probable alternatives, a
selection which is independent of the existence of other universes. The events which
give rise to universes are not causally related in such a way that the outcome of one
renders the outcome of another more or less probable. They are like independent rolls
of a die. That is,
P(E I M) = P(Tial M) = 1/n = P(Tal -M) = P(E I -M)
Given M, it is likely that some universe instantiates T1, and it is true that ca instantiates
some Ti, but it is highly improbable that the Ti instantiated by a is T1, regardless of the
truth of M. So by P2, P(M I E) = P(M), i.e., the fact that our universe is life-permitting
does not confirm the Multiple Universe hypothesis one iota. Perhaps the claim that it
does results from a confusion between E and E'.
Ian Hacking (1987) has made a similar criticism with respect to J. A. Wheeler's
oscillating universe theory, according to which our universe is the latest of a long
temporal sequence of universes. Hacking labels the mistake involved the Inverse
Gambler's Fallacy, suggesting that it is related to the notorious Gambler's Fallacy. The
Gambler's Fallacy: After throwing a pair of dice repeatedly without getting a double
six, the gambler concludes that he has a much better chance of getting it on the next roll,
since he is unlikely to roll several times without a double six. The Inverse Gambler's
Fallacy: The gambler is asked 'Has this pair of dice been rolled before?' He asks to see
the dice rolled before he makes a judgment. They land double six. He concludes that
they probably have been rolled several times, since they are so unlikely to land double
six in one roll, but are quite likely to after several.
There is no doubt that Hacking has identified a fallacy here. He suggests that this is
what is at work in the inference from the fine-tuning of our universe, to Wheeler's
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hypothesis that ours is just the most recent in a long sequence of universes. We note that
against all odds, the big bang has produced a life-permitting universe--extremely
unlikely in one shot, but highly likely after several. So we conclude that there have
probably been many big bangs in the past. The mistake is in supposing that the
existence of many other universes makes it more likely that this one--the only one that
we have observed-will be life-permitting. The Inverse Gambler's Fallacy combines the
Gambler's Fallacy with P1, so the usual antidotes to the gambler's reasoning should be
instructive here also. Wheeler universes, like dice, 'have no memories', the individual
oscillations are stochastically independent. Previous big bangs in the sequence have no
effect on the outcome of any other big bang, so they cannot render it more likely to
produce a life-permitting universe. Although Hacking does not mention them, similar
points apply to models of coexisting universes. These universes are usually taken to be
causally isolated, or if there is any causal relation between them, it is not of a type that
could increase the probability of this universe being life-permitting.
III. Our universe vs. some universe
Let us now turn to a common response to the arguments above. I have been insisting
that a is no more likely to be life-permitting no matter how many other universes there
are, but of course the more universes there are, the more likely it is that some universe
supports life. That is, M raises the probability of E' but not E. But now, the response
goes, we know that E' is true since it follows from E. So E' confirms M even if E does
not. In other words, our knowledge that arme universe is life-permitting seems to give
us reason to accept the Multiple Universe hypothesis, even if our knowledge that a is
life-permitting does not."
We can quickly see that there is something going wrong here. A known proposition,
the probability of which is not raised by the hypothesis, is being set aside in favor of a
weaker proposition, the probability of which is raised by the hypothesis. The weaker
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proposition is then taken as evidence for the hypothesis. Suppose I'm wondering why I
feel sick today, and someone suggests that perhaps Adam got drunk last night. I object
that I have no reason to believe this hypothesis since Adam's drunkenness would not
raise the probability of me feeling sick. But, the reply goes, it does raise the probability
that someone in the room feels sick, and we know that this is true, since we know that
you feel sick, so the fact that someone in the room feels sick is evidence that Adam got
drunk. Clearly something is wrong with this reasoning. Perhaps if all I knew (by word
of mouth, say) was that someone or other was sick, this would provide some evidence
that Adam got drunk. But not when I know specifically that I feel sick. This suggests
that in the confirming of hypotheses, we cannot, as a general rule, set aside a specific
piece of evidence in favor of a weaker piece.
What has gone wrong here seems to be a failure to consider the total evidence
available to us. If the extent of our knowledge was just E', then this would count as
evidence for M, since P(M I E') > P(M). But we also know E, and must not leave that out
of our calculation of the probability of M. What matters is the probability of M given E'
and E. But now since E entails E', (E' & E) is equivalent to E. So P(M I E' & E) = P(M I E).
But as we have seen above, P(M I E) is just equal to P(M). Hence P(M I E' & E) = P(M). So
while the Multiple Universe hypothesis may be confirmed by E' alone, it is not
confirmed by E' in conjunction with the more specific fact E, which we also know. It
does not matter in which order we calculate the relevance of E and E', our confidence in
M on our total evidence should remain the same as it is without considering E or E'.
Consider how this fits with our intuitions about the gambler's reasoning. Suppose
on being asked how many times the pair of dice have been rolled, the gambler asks if a
double six has been rolled. Upon learning that one has, he is more confident than he
was that the dice have been rolled a number of times. Here his reasoning is sound, for
the more times the dice have been rolled, the greater the chance that a double six has
been rolled. However, when the gambler witnesses a single roll and is then more
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confident that the dice have been rolled before, he is clearly making a mistake. The
difference is that in the first case, the information he has gained is just that some roll or
other landed double six, in the second case, he witnesses a specific roll. Compare this
with the case where astronomers discover that one or more other big bangs have
occurred, and ask us to guess if there have been one or many. We might ask whether
any had produced a universe containing life, and on learning that one did, be more
inclined to suppose that there have been many. This reasoning would be correct. But
this is not our situation. Like the gambler in the second case we have simply witnessed
a single big bang producing this universe. And no number of other big bangs can affect
the probability of the outcome we observed.
IV. Carter's Hypothesis
Puzzlingly, Hacking believes there is a version of the Multiple Universe hypothesis
which avoids the errors that we have been considering. He interprets Brandon Carter as
proposing a set of coexisting universes instantiating all possible configurations of initial
conditions and fundamental constants. Hacking argues that there is no fallacy of
probability involved here since the inference is deductive: "Why do we exist? Because
we are a possible universe, and all possible universes exist...Everything in this
reasoning is deductive. It has nothing to do with the inverse gambler's fallacy" (1987, p.
337).
I believe Hacking is making a similar mistake as that identified above. Carter's
hypothesis can be represented as M*: (Vi)(3x)Tix. Now M* certainly entails E': (3x)Tlx.
But it does not entail, nor does it raise the probability of E: T1i,. From the hypothesis
that each of the possible configurations of initial conditions and constants is instantiated
in some actual universe, it follows that some universe meets the conditions required for
life. It by no means follows that a does. The situation here is parallel to the standard
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Multiple Universe hypothesis M. Where M raised the probability of E', but not E, M*
entails E', but does not entail E.
In saying that "our universe follows deductively from [M*]" (p. 339) Hacking may
mean to say that the existence of a universe of the same type as ours-one instantiating
the same set of conditions and constants-follows deductively from M*, and this would
certainly be correct. He may wish to maintain that it is the existence of a universe of our
type, that constitutes evidence for Carter's hypothesis. But if this move worked, we
could likewise argue that this same fact confirms Wheeler's hypothesis, for the existence
of a long sequence of universes does raise the probability that a universe of our type
will exist at some time. Since Hacking, correctly in my view, finds fault with the
argument for Wheeler's hypothesis, he should likewise find fault with the argument for
Carter's.
V. The Observational Selection Effect
Hacking's inverse gambler's fallacy argument has received a series of replies and I will
turn now to consider these. Leslie's first complaint is that "Hacking's story involves no
observational selection effect." (1988, p. 270). An observational selection effect is a
feature of a process which restricts the type of outcomes of an event which are
observable. In the case of the big bang, had the universe not instantiated T, then neither
we nor anyone else would be around to notice, since the necessary conditions for life
would not have been met. So even though big bangs can so easily result in dud
universes, no one ever has the misfortune of seeing one. In an attempt to show how
such an effect can be crucial to the inference to multiple universes, a number of
intriguing analogies have been suggested. I will focus on two analogies suggested by P.
J. McGrath, as I believe they capture the essence of each of the stories suggested in the
literature (my critique of these carries over to the other stories). In each case I will argue
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that the inference involved in the story is correct, but the story is not analogous to our
situation with respect to the universe.
The first case involves an analogy with Wheeler's oscillating universe theory.
Case A: Jane takes a nap at the beginning of a dice rolling session, on the
understanding that she will be woken as soon as a double six is rolled and not
before. Upon being woken she infers that the dice have been rolled a number of
times.'
The reasoning here certainly seems legitimate, but it will pay us to be clear on why this
is so. Note that it seems that even before she takes a nap, she should predict that she
will be woken after a number of rolls. This is roughly because it is unlikely that a
double six occurs in just a few rolls, and hence the first double six is likely to occur later
than a few rolls. Now if it is reasonable to predict this before she takes the nap, it is just
as reasonable to believe this afterward. But there is an implicit assumption involved
here, namely that there will be many rolls, or at least as many as it takes to get a double
six.
It is not clear that McGrath intended that this assumption be made in the story, but it
is in fact necessary for his conclusion that she "is entitled to conclude, when roused, that
it is probable that the dice have been rolled at least twenty-five times" (p. 266). How do
we calculate the figure twenty-five? This calculation crucially depends on a prior
probability distribution over hypotheses concerning the maximum number of times the
dice rollers will roll. Suppose Jane knows that they are planning to roll just once, unless
they happen to win the lottery that day, in which case they will roll many times. In this
case Jane is certainly not entitled to the conclusion that McGrath suggests.
To consider the matter more carefully, we can let W = Jane is woken, and partition
this into two hypotheses WL = Jane is woken in twenty-five rolls or more, and WE =
Jane is woken in less than twenty-five rolls. The prior probability of there being no
double six in the first 24 rolls, P(-WE) = (35/36)24 - 0.5. When Jane is roused and hence
47
knows W is true, how confident should she be that twenty-five or more rolls have
occurred?
P(WL I W) = P(WL & W)/P(W)
= P(WL)/P(W) (since WL entails W)
= [P(W) - P(WE)]/P(W)
= P(-WE) if and only if P(W) = 1
If P(W) is significantly less than one, then P(WL I W) < 0.5. So Jane is entitled to
conclude, when roused, that it is probable that the dice have been rolled at least twenty-
five times, only on the assumption that the prior probability of her being woken was
close to one, i.e., that it was almost guaranteed that the dice would be rolled many
times, or at least enough times for a double six to appear.'0
Now it should be clear that this assumption is not welcome in the case of the
universe. It will be useful here to make use of some propositions which Hacking
distinguishes for a different purpose:
W1: Our universe is one of a large temporal sequence of universes
W2: Our universe has been preceded by very many universes1
W 2 is quite probable given W1. For on the basis of W1 we know that there exists,
speaking timelessly, a temporally ordered sequence of universes in space-time. But we
do not know which position in the sequence our universe holds. Whenever we have a
large sequence of objects, the probability that a particular object will be very early in the
sequence will be very low. So if the sequence of universes entailed by W1 is large
enough, it renders W2 highly probable (note that this reasoning has nothing to do with
fine-tuning).12 But of course we do not know that W1is the case. We only know that our
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universe is fine-tuned for life. The truth of W 1 is part of what we are trying to figure out.
So McGrath's story is not relevant to the question at hand.
Now let us consider McGrath's second analogy, which is drawn with a model of
coexisting universes.
Case B: Jane knows that an unspecified number of players will simultaneously
roll a pair of dice just once, and that she will be woken if, and only if, a double
six is rolled. Upon being woken she infers that there were several players
rolling dice."
Once again Jane's reasoning seems to be cogent. However, McGrath is mistaken in
supposing that this case is essentially the same as Case A, and that as before, Jane is
entitled to infer that there were probably at least twenty-five players rolling dice. The
judgment concerning the twenty-five rolls had to do with the position within a
sequence that the first double six occurred. There is no such sequence in Case B, and in
fact the reasoning should proceed along very different lines. The probability of Jane
being woken is raised by the Multiple Rolls hypothesis, since she is to be woken if and
only if some player rolls a double six. And the more players there are, the greater the
chance that at least one of them will roll a double six. There is no inverse gambler's
fallacy here. Jane's evidence is not about the outcome of a particular roll, but simply the
fact that she has been woken. And the probability of this fact is raised by the Multiple
Rolls hypothesis, given the policy of the dice rollers to wake her upon any double six.
To see what is fishy about this case however, let us compare it with the following
Case B*: Jane knows that she is one of an unspecified number of sleepers each
of which has a unique partner who will roll a pair of dice. Each sleeper will be
woken if and only if her partner rolls a double six. Upon being woken, Jane
infers that there are several sleepers and dice rollers.
Jane's reasoning here is unsound. She may of course have independent grounds for the
Multiple Rolls hypothesis, but her being woken adds nothing. The crucial difference
here concerns the nature of the observational selection effect involved. In each case, if
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there is no double six rolled then Jane will not be woken. But in Case B, the converse
holds also: if some double six is rolled, then Jane will be woken, whereas in Case B*,
Jane's being woken depends on a single roll. It is this converse observational selection
effect at work in Case B that provides a link between the evidence (her having been
woken) and the Multiple Rolls hypothesis. Since this is lacking in Case B*, the Multiple
Rolls hypothesis does not raise the probability of Jane being woken. So Jane has no
grounds to infer that there were many dice rollers.
The crucial question therefore, is whether the case of our observership in the
universe involves a similar converse selection effect. It strikes me that it obviously does
not. As Leslie admits, it is not as though we were disembodied spirits waiting for a big
bang to produce some universe which could accommodate us. We are products of the
big bang which produced this universe. It is certainly not sufficient for us to exist in
some universe P, that p is fine-tuned, or even that 0 is qualitatively exactly as a actually
is. After all, if we postulate enough universes, the chances are that there exist several
life-permitting universes, perhaps even universes with precisely the same initial
conditions and fundamental constants as our universe, and containing human beings
indistinguishable from us. But we do not inhabit these universes, other folks do. If we
accept Kripke's (1980) thesis of the necessity of origins, we should hold that no other big
bang could possibly produce us. But even if this thesis is denied, even if it is
metaphysically possible for us to have evolved in a different universe, or be products of
a different big bang, we have no reason to suppose that we would exist if a different
universe had been fine-tuned. In order for the Multiple Universe hypothesis to render
our existence more probable, there must be some mechanism analogous to that in Case
B linking the multiplicity of universes with our existence. But there is no such
mechanism. So the existence of lots of universes does not seem to make it any more
likely that we should be around to see one. So the converse selection effect does not
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hold, and hence McGrath's analogy fails to vindicate the reasoning from the fact that we
are alive to see a fine-tuned universe to the hypothesis that our universe is one of many.
VI. Improbable and Surprising Events
Let us turn to the second and perhaps more tempting of reasoning in support of the
Multiple Universe hypothesis. At some points, Leslie insists that although multiple
universes do not render the fine-tuning of our universe, or even our existence, less
improbable, they do render it less surprising, and it is the latter which is significant. The
distinction between surprising and unsurprising improbable events is easily illustrated
with examples. It is unsurprising that Jane won a lottery out of a billion participants,
but it is surprising that Jim won three lotteries in a row each with a thousand
participants (even though the probability in each case is one in a billion). It is
unsurprising that a monkey types "nie348n sio 9q;c", but when she types "I want a
banana!" we are astonished..
Now it is a familiar theme in the philosophy of science that scientific knowledge
often advances by making that which is puzzling understandable. We should not be
content with events like a monkey typing English sentences, we must seek some
account that makes these events understandable. It seems then that any theory which
could remove the surprising nature of the fine-tuning data would thereby be confirmed.
As Leslie suggests "a fairly reliable sign of correctness is ability to reduce amazement."
(1988, p. 112) And the Multiple Universe theory does seem to do just that. For given
enough universes it is unsurprising that there is a life-permitting one, and it is
unsurprising that we happen to be in a life-permitting one since we could not be in any
other kind. Doesn't the fact that this story satisfyingly accounts for what is otherwise
puzzling make it plausible?
The idea here can be brought out in another way. That the universe, by pure chance,
should have such a fine adjustment of physical parameters to allow for the evolution of
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life would be extraordinary, and it is contrary to reason to believe in the extraordinary
(like believing that a monkey wrote Hamlet, or that Rembrandt's works are entirely the
result of randomly spilt paint). One way to avoid believing that an extraordinary
coincidence has occurred is to accept that the universe is the product of intelligent
design, another is to suppose that ours is one of very many universes. One or the other
of these, it is argued, must be prefered to the Extraordinary Fluke hypothesis. So if the
Design hypothesis is is not to your liking, the Multiple Universe hypothesis is a
plausible alternative.
This intuition is not entirely misguided. In many cases where a hypothesis renders
an event less surprising, the hypothesis is thereby confirmed. For one way to make an
event less surprising is to make it less improbable. And according to P1, raising the
probability of an event is one way that a hypothesis can be confirmed. But according to
the probabilistic account of confirmation this is the only way that a hypothesis is
confirmed by the occurrence of an improbable event. I hope to remove the temptation to
suppose that any hypothesis which reduces the surprisingness of an event is thereby
confirmed, by considering a counter-example (ironically one of Leslie's) and by giving a
satisfying probabilistic account of how a hypothesis can render an event less surprising
without being confirmed.
The distinction between surprising and unsurprising improbable events is an
important one that deserves much attention, yet it has received very little in the
literature. There is not the space here to consider the matter in depth. I will sketch an
account of surprisingness, drawing on suggestions by Paul Horwich (1982), which is
adequate for the purposes of our discussion. The crucial feature of surprising events
seems to be that they challenge our assumptions about the circumstances in which they
occurred. If at first we assume that the monkey is typing randomly, then her typing
"nie348n sio 9q" does nothing to challenge this assumption. But when she types "I want
a banana" we suspect that this was more than an accident. The difference is that in the
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second case there is some alternative but not wildly improbable hypothesis concerning
the conditions in which the event took place, upon which it is much more probable. On
the assumption that the monkey is typing randomly, it is just as improbable that she
types "nie348n sio 9q" as it is that she types "I want a banana". But that the second
sequence is typed is more probable on the hypothesis that it was not merely a
coincidence, but that an intelligent agent had something to do with it, either by training
the monkey or rigging the typewriter, or something similar. There is no such hypothesis
(except an extremely improbable ad hoc one) which raises the probability that the
monkey would type the first sequence. Of course by P1, the human intervention
hypothesis is confirmed in the case of "I want a banana". So what makes the event
surprising is that it forces us to reconsider our initial assumptions about how the string
of letters was produced (of course someone who already believes that the typewriter
was rigged should not be surprised).
Why is it surprising that the universe is fine-tuned for life? Perhaps because on the
assumption that the big bang was just an accident it is extremely improbable that it
would be life-permitting, but it is far more likely on the assumption that there exists an
intelligent designer, for a designer might prefer to bring about a universe which is
inhabitable by other intelligent creatures, rather than a homogeneous cosmic soup. The
event is surprising in that it forces us to question whether the big bang really was an
accident (someone who already believes in a designer should not be surprised that the
universe is life-sustaining)."'
VII. Leslie's Shooting Analogy
To see the way that different hypotheses can affect the surprisingness of an event,
consider one of Leslie's analogies." You are alone in the forest when a gun is fired from
far away and you are hit. If at first you assume that there is no one out to get you, this
would be surprising. But now suppose you were not in fact alone but instead part of a
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large crowd. Now it seems there is less reason for surprise at being shot. After all,
someone in the crowd was bound to be shot, and it might as well have been you.
Leslie suggests this as an analogy for our situation with respect to the universe.
Ironically, it seems that Leslie's story supports my case, against his. For it seems that
while knowing that you are part of a crowd makes your being shot less surprising,
being shot gives you no reason at all to suppose that you are part of a crowd. Suppose it
is pitch dark and you have no idea if you are alone or part of a crowd. The bullet hits
you. Do you really have any reason at all now to suppose that there are others around
you?
Let us examine the case more carefully. While it is intuitively clear that the existence
of many people surrounding you should reduce the surprisingness of your being shot,
there does not exist an adequate account of why this is so. I will present an original
analysis of this surprisingness reduction, which both helps us see why reduction of
surprisingness need not involve confirmation, and serves as a model for a deeper
understanding of the relation between fine-tuning data and multiple universes. Let
E = You are shot
D = The gunman was malicious and not shooting accidentally (the Design
hypothesis)
M = You are part of a large crowd (the Multiple People hypothesis)
We begin with the assumption that you are alone and the gun was fired randomly.
P(E I -D & ~M) is very low, i.e. there is a slim chance that a randomly fired bullet would
hit you, for there is a wide range in which the bullet could move, equal intervals of
roughly equal probability, those in which the bullet hits you constituting only a small
proportion. But P(E ID & -M) is greater, since if there is no other interesting target
about you, then a malicious shooter is more likely to aim at you. So
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P(E ID & -M) > P(E I ~D & ~M),
and hence by P1,
P(D IE & -M) > P(D I -M)
i.e., the fact that you have been shot confirms the malicious gunman hypothesis, on the
assumption that you are alone. This is what makes your being shot surprising, it
challenges you to reconsider whether the shooting really was accidental (if you already
knew that the gunman was a psychopath, you should not be surprised at getting hit).
Now consider the case where you know that you are part of a crowd. P(E I -D & M),
is still very low, for the same reason that P(E I ~D & ~M) is. But unlike P(E I D & ~M),
P(E I D & M) is not much higher than P(E I -D & M), if higher at all. The reason is that
while a malicious shooter may be expected to shoot a person, there is little reason to
suppose that he would intend to shoot you in particular (unless perhaps you are the
President). The probability that he will shoot someone is high, given that there is a
crowd there, but the probability that it will be you remains very low, regardless of
whether the shooting is deliberate. So
P(E ID & M) ~ P(E I -D & M)
and hence
P(DIE & M) = P(D I M)
i.e. the fact that you have been shot does not confirm the malicious gunman hypothesis
on the assumption that you are part of a crowd.
What happens here is that the Multiple People hypothesis M screens off the
probabilistic support that D lends to E, and hence also screens off the support that E
lends to D, i.e., relative to M, E and D are probabilistically independent. So if you first
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assumed that you were alone, your being shot may count as evidence that the gunman
was firing deliberately. But if you later discover that you are part of a large crowd
(perhaps it was pitch dark before), there is no longer any reason to question your
original assumption that the shooting was accidental. So the Multiple People hypothesis
renders your having been shot less surprising.
However, the Multiple People hypothesis does not raise the probability that you
would be shot. No matter how many people are about you, a randomly fired bullet has
the same chance of hitting you. So P(E I M & ~D) = P(E I -M & -D). But now it follows
by P2 that P(M IE & -D) = P(M I -D). So the Multiple People hypothesis is not
confirmed by the fact you have been shot, on the assumption that the bullet was fired
randomly.1 6 17
Someone may still be tempted to suppose that being shot gives them some reason to
suppose that there are many people about. For getting shot all alone in an open field
from far away would be extraordinary, and we should not believe in the extraordinary.
One way to avoid accepting that something extraordinary has occurred is to suppose
that the shot was fired deliberately, but another is to suppose that there are many
people about. So if the Malicious Gunman hypothesis seems ruled out on other grounds
(just as many find the Designer of the Universe hypothesis hard to swallow) then the
Multiple People hypothesis might seem a plausible alternative.
I suggest that anyone who is still inclined to think this way might like to put their
money where their mouth is in the following simulation experiment (we can use paint-
balls instead of bullets). You are blindfolded and ear-muffed in a large area, knowing
that there is an n% probability that you are in a large crowd, otherwise you are alone.
(A ball is drawn from a hundred, n of which are red. A crowd is assembled just in case a
red is drawn). Clearly if asked to bet that you are in a crowd, you should accept odds
up to n:100-n. But now a paint-ball is fired randomly from a long distance and happens
to hit you. Are you now more than n% confident that you are part of a crowd? If so you
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should be willing to accept odds higher than n:100-n. And if so, I suggest we play the
game repeatedly, with you betting at higher odds on each of the rare occasions that a
bullet hits you. On this strategy I should win all your money in the long run. For we
will find that in only n% of those occasions in which you are shot, you are part of a
crowd. If we take reasonable betting odds as a guide to reasonable degrees of
confidence, this experiment supports my claim that being shot gives you no reason to
suppose that you are part of a crowd.
VIII. Conclusion
The example illustrates that removal of surprise need not involve confirmation. A
hypothesis can be such that if we knew it to be true, it would make a certain event less
surprising, yet the fact that it makes this event less surprising gives us no reason to
suppose that the hypothesis is true." We are now in a position to give a deeper analysis
of the way that the Multiple Universe hypothesis reduces the surprisingness of the fine-
tuning data. Assuming there is just the one universe, the fact that it is life-permitting is
surprising. For this otherwise extremely improbable outcome of the big bang is more
probable on the assumption that there is a cosmic designer, who might adjust the
physical parameters to allow for the evolution of life. So the fine-tuning facts challenge
us to question whether the big bang was merely an accident.
However, on the assumption that our universe is just one of very many, the
existence of a designer does not raise the probability that our universe should be life-
permitting. For while we might suppose that a designer would create some intelligent
life somewhere, there is little reason to suppose it would be here rather than in one of
the many other universes. It is only on the assumption that there are no other options
that we should expect a designer to fine-tune this universe for life. Given the existence
of many universes, it is already probable that some universe will be fine-tuned; the
Design hypothesis does not add to the probability that any particular universe will be
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fine-tuned. So the Multiple Universe hypothesis screens off the probabilistic link
between the Design hypothesis and the fine-tuning data. Hence if we happened to
know, on independent grounds, that there are many universes, the fine-tuning facts
would give us little reason to question whether the big bang was an accident, and hence
our knowledge of the existence of many universes would render the fine-tuning of our
universe unsurprising. However, postulate as many other universes as you wish, they
do not make it any more likely that ours should be life-permitting or that we should be
here. So our good fortune to exist in a life-permitting universe gives us no reason to
suppose that there are many universes.' 9
Notes
See also Clifton (1991), Leslie (1988), McGrath (1988), Smith (1986) and Whitaker
(1988).
2 See Leslie (1989) for a summary of the fine-tuning data, and Barrow and Tippler
(1986) for a detailed account.
3 See the above references for accounts of multiple universe theories.
A partial exception is Hacking (1987), who as we will see, agrees only in a special
case. Earman (1987) expresses his doubts about the inference, but does not argue the
point at any length.
' For convenience, I use "T1" and the like sometimes as names for configurations,
sometimes as predicates. The use should be clear from the context.
6 The name 'a' is to be understood here as rigidly designating the universe which
happens to be ours. Of course, in one sense, a universe can't be ours unless it is life-
permitting. But the universe which happens actually to be ours, namely oc, might not
have been ours, or anyone's. It had a slim chance of containing life at all.
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SThis can be seen briefly as follows: for any i, the probability that a particular
universe is Ti is 1/n, so the probability that it is not is 1-1/n, and the probability that
each of k universes is not Ti is (1-1/n)k. Hence the probability that some universe is Ti,
given that there are k universes, is 1- (1 - 1/n)k
s The point is sometimes made in terms of explanation, where explanation is
understood to involve raising of probability. What is surprising, and needs explanation,
the argument goes, is just that there is a life-permitting universe, not that there is this
one. The Multiple Universe hypothesis does explain the existence of a life-permitting
universe by rendering it probable. Once this is explained, the specific question of why
this universe is fine-tuned for life does not require an answer, since it is not surprising.
The issue of surprisingness and reduction of surprisingness is addressed in §§ VI-VII;
explanation is briefly discussed in note 17.
' Adapted from McGrath (1987, p. 265). Leslie (1987) considers an equivalent story in
which a person is created ex nihilo upon a double six. Whitaker's (1987) first story
involves a two month period during which a casino is allowed to open on a night only if
a double six is rolled in one go that night. We see a photo of the open casino in the
gossip column and conclude that it was taken much later than the first night. In the
second story, you send out researchers to knock on doors until they find a particular
unusual kind of family. When they return, you conclude that they were not successful
at the first house, but at one much later. I believe my objections to McGrath's case are
equally relevant to these cases.
10 Without this assumption Jane is not entitled to conclude that there have been
twenty-five rolls, but she does have evidence that there have been multiple rolls. The
crucial point here is that sh_ will be woken no matter which roll lands double six. The
problem that this raises will be discussed in relation to Cases B and B*.
" Adapted from Hacking (1987, p.399)
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12 Both Whitaker and Hacking are mistaken on this point. Whitaker (p. 264) claims
that W2 follows from W1. Hacking claims that "W2 does not follow from, nor is it made
probable by Wi" (p. 399) The correct view is that W2 does not follow from but is made
probable by W1. The reasons here are slightly different than in the dice case, since we do
not know that we inhabit the first life-permitting universe in the sequence.
13 Adapted from McGrath (1987, p.267). Whitaker adapts his story of the casino such
that the rule applies only one night, but to more than one casino. If there are several
casinos, we should expect to see photos of one of them open, since the photographer
will visit an open one. As before, 1 believe my objections apply equally to this case.
1 Some will object that the Design hypothesis is so improbable given our
background knowledge that it is not significantly confirmed by the fine-tuning data,
and hence does not challenge our assumption that the outcome of the big bang was an
accident. I disagree, but there is no need to argue the point here. The argument for
multiple universes under consideration depends on the assumption that the life-
permitting character of the universe is surprising, which is the case only if there is some,
not wildly improbable hypothesis, which renders it far more probable than it is given
that it was the result of chance. If the hypothesis is not one of intelligent design, I am
not sure what it could be. If there is no such hypothesis, we should not be puzzled by
universe containing life, but view it as just one of the many highly improbable possible
outcomes of the big bang-in which case the current motivation for multiple universes
loses its force.
1 This is adapted from Leslie's (1988) version of the story. In the discussion that
follows, it should be distinguished from Leslie's (1989) version which is told from the
point of view of the shooter.
'b6 On the assumption of D, E disconfirms M, for if the gunman is firing deliberately,
he is less likely to shoot you, if there are many equally interesting targets about.
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' One reason that it is tempting always to take a theory's ability to reduce the
surprisingness of data as evidence in its favor is that it is plausible that a theory's ability
to explain data, is always evidence in its favor. And a central role of explanation is the
reduction of surprisingness. I think that the example shows that reduction of
surprisingness is not sufficient for explanation. It seems wrong to say that the Multiple
People hypothesis explains your being shot, for at least three reasons. First,
explanations should answer why-questions, but the answer to 'Why were you shot?' is
not 'Because there were many people surrounding you'. Second, the fact that you were
part of a crowd is not causally relevant to your being shot, and third, your being in a
crowd does not raise your chances of being shot. (Similarly, the answer to 'Why is a
life-permitting?' is not 'Because there are lots of other universes'. Nor is the existence of
many universes causally or probabilistically relevant to ot containing life). If there is a
sense of 'explains' in which your being in a crowd explains your being shot, this can
only show that in this sense of the term, explanation is not sufficient for confirmation.
'" Numerous examples illustrate this point. In Case B*, Jane has reason to be
surprised when woken if she thinks she is the only sleeper (we can make it more
surprising by using ten dice landing all sixes, instead of a pair), but not if she knows
there are many sleepers and dice rollers. But here being woken gives her no reason to
suppose that there are other sleepers and dice rollers. Or consider one of Leslie's (1989)
favorite analogies of fine-tuning and multiple universes. You stand before a firing
squad, the guns go off, but you are still alive! Astonishing if you are alone in this
situation; not so amazing if there are billions of people about before similar firing
squads. Yet again, your surviving the firing squad gives you no reason to accept the
Multiple Firing Squad hypothesis, even if this hypothesis is plausible to begin with.
1 My thoughts in the early sections of this paper owe a great deal to numerous
discussions with Phil Dowe. I must also thank William Alston, Adam Elga, Ned Hall,
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Neil Manson, Brent Mundy, Robert Stalnaker, Peter van Inwagen and two anonymous
referees for helpful discussions on this topic and/or comments on earlier drafts.
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Chapter III: Does Life call for an Explanation?
1. Introduction
Although teleological explanations are unpopular these days, philosophers and
scientists are no less eager to explain the mystery of the origin of life. This puzzles me.
In this paper I will explore what it is for something to call for an explanation, and argue
that if the existence of life needs an explanation at all, the place to look is in a
teleological one. If this option is ruled out, we should be content to view the origin of
life as just an extremely improbable fluke.
2. Three Cases of Pebbles
Not all states of affairs call for an explanation. Take the fact that the pebbles on the
sidewalk fell in the arrangement of Figure 1. If someone were to ask why they fell in just
that pattern, we should be satisfied with the response "There's no reason, a car wheel
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Of course it is highly improbable that a chance scattering of pebbles should result in
precisely this arrangement on the path, but it would be a mistake to slide from this to
the conclusion that it is improbable that the arrangement of the pebbles was due to
anything but chance. Improbabilities are commonplace-people win lotteries, hands of
cards are dealt, etc.--without giving us any reason to suspect that there is deeper reason
for their occurrence than just blind chance.
Of course there might be an explanation for the arrangement of the pebbles in
Figure 1. Perhaps they were placed there deliberately to form a message in a secret
code, or perhaps there are certain physical laws and properties of pebbles, either
unknown or whose consequences are unappreciated which render it likely that even if
the pebbles are tossed at random they will arrange themselves in this kind of pattern.
But while explanations of this kind are possible, we have no reason to pursue these
possibilities. It is not just that they are far fetched; even if we are very open minded
about these suggestions, the fact that the pebbles are arranged as they are gives us no
reason at all to suppose that there is any explanation for their arrangement. This







Not so for all states of affairs. Suppose the pebbles are arranged as in Figure 2. In
this case we would have a hard time believing that they got this way by chance.
Perhaps the fact that the stones are in precisely this arrangement is not something for
which we should expect an explanation, but there are weaker facts regarding the pebble
arrangement, which do call for an explanation, for instance the fact that they are
arranged in the shape of a smiley faced stick-figure, or that they form some kind of
representational pattern. There can be no doubt about the general form of the
explanation in this case, namely that the pebbles were placed in position on purpose by
an agent. Perhaps for this to count as a full explanation, a few more details would have
to be filled in as to who arranged the pebbles and how and why, but their being
arranged as they are is enough to give us confidence that some explanation along these
lines is correct, and perhaps motivate us, if we are interested, to find the full
explanation.
Figure 3
We are struck by a similar need for explanation when the pebbles are arranged as in
Figure 3, in descending order of size toward the water, as we find them at the English
sea-side. But here the explanation presumably has nothing to do with the purposes of
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an agent, but rather the lawful correlations between physical properties such as volume,
density, mass and inertia (my rough guess is that as the waves and tides wash in and
out, the smaller stones being lighter are more easily swept back to the shoreline). Even if
we know next to nothing about physics, the simple regularity of the pattern of the
pebbles suggests that they didn't get that way just by chance.
3. The need for explanation
We say that a fact calls for, or needs, or sometimes even demands or cries out for an
explanation when we have reason to believe that it has an explanation. Here of course
the term 'explanation' is being used in two different senses. The word can refer to the
activity of answering a why-question such as "Why are the pebbles arranged in this
way", or it can refer to those facts to which we appeal in answering such questions,
such as that Mary was making a picture of her mum. So we can speak of giving
something an explanation or leaving it unexplained, and in another sense say that it has
or lacks an explanation independently of anyone's attempt to explain it. At a first
approximation then, fact calls for an explanation (i.e., we have reason to try to give it
one, assuming we are interested in the matter) if we have reason to believe it has an
explanation, without necessarily having a clear idea yet of what the explanation is. But
this cannot be quite right. If an oracle informed us that the pebbles in Figure 1 are there
for some reason, but gives us no hint as to what explains their arrangement, perhaps we
should take his word for it. But I would still resist saying in this case that the
arrangement of the pebbles called for an explanation. What seems to be closer to
capturing the idea is that the arrangement of the pebbles calls for an explanation, if their
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being arranged that way is what renders it unlikely that they just fell that way by
chance, i.e., that there is no explanation for their arrangement.'
As I am using the terms, a fact came about by chance just in case it has no
explanation. But what do I mean by this? When I say that the pebbles of Figure 1 fell
that way by chance I do not mean that their arrangement is the result of an
indeterministic process (this would be sufficient for being a chance outcome, but not
necessary). The laws that govern the motion of macroscopic objects are close enough to
deterministic that a detailed enough description of the world prior to the pebbles
having landed there would allow us to predict with a fair amount of precision the way
they would land. The issues with which I am concerned here are independent of the
question of determinism; it should make no difference in the following discussion if we
simply assume that determinism is true. Nor when I say that the pebbles of Figure 1 fell
that way by chance do I mean merely that there was no purpose behind their being in
that pattern (this would be necessary but not sufficient for being a chance outcome). The
pebbles on the beach in Figure 3 did not land in their ordered pattern by chance, but no
one arranged them that way on purpose either.
It is not easy to spell out what this notion of chance is, but I believe it is a familiar
one. We speak of games of chance, involving dice and roulette wheels, and say that the
winners of such games won by chance. By chance I might run into an old friend I
haven't seen in years. A few decades ago scientists claimed that the very earliest living
organism was the result of a "chance collision of molecules" in a prebiotic soup. In each
case these claims seem to be consistent with determinism, yet more is being said than
i This probably isn't quite right either. A fact can only render the chance hypothesis unlikely with the help of other
background assumptions. But what if these include the fact that an oracle has told us: "If you find the pebbles
arranged as in Figure 2, then they fell that way by chance, if they are as in Figure 1, then they did not."? This kind of
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just that no agent purposely brought about these events. What seems common to each
case is that there is no explanation for the outcome. When scientists these days dismiss
the chance hypothesis concerning the origin of life, they are insisting that there must be
some explanation for life's emergence, although it need not, have anything to do with
the work of an intelligent agent.
Now someone might complain that if determinism is true, or even approximately
true at the macroscopic level, then every contingent state of affairs, including the
arrangement of pebbles in Figure 1, has an explanation. The explanation would consist
in a precise description of the positions and momenta of the pebbles at some earlier
time, along with various environmental conditions. This would seem to satisfy two of
the most important criteria of a good explanation: the explanans renders the
explanandum highly probable (in this case, if the description is precise enough, it
nomically guarantees the explanandum), and if the explanans hadn't obtained then
neither would the explanandum.
I do not have a rigorous account of chance and explanation with which I can rule
out this kind of story as an explanation. I will have to rely on your intuitive grasp of
these notions as I believe they are employed in both everyday and scientific
applications. I will however do little bit of hand waving which might be helpful to our
discussion. There are a couple of differences between the attempted explanation of the
pebble arrangement in Figure 1 and the genuine explanations of those in Figures 2 and
3, which make me want to deny the first the status of explanation. First, to attempt to
explain the arrangement of Figure 1, we had to appeal to a very specific and apparently
arbitrary set of initial conditions, which were no more likely, or indeed less likely than
case is quirky enough that I think we can ignore it here. We don't need a rigorous analysis of the need for
explanation for our purposes here.
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the arrangement we were seeking to explain. In the explanation of the pebbles of
Figures 2 and 3, the outcome was not sensitive to initial conditions in this way. If Mary
was planning to arrange some pebbles in a picture of her mum, then the pebbles could
start out in a wide range of initial positions and end up in a stick-figure pattern.
Similarly, the pebbles in Figure 3 could start out in any kind of scattering, the motion of
the waves and tides would eventually sift them into an ordered arrangement from large
to small. Second, our attempt to explain the pebbles in Figure 1, involved a number of
independent lines of causation. The specific set of initial conditions gave us a causal
story of how this pebble landed there, and this one there, and so on, but these were all
causally independent. In our explanations of the pebbles in Figures 2 and 3, we gave a
common cause for the arrangement of the pebbles. These suggestions are only the
beginning of a an account of chance and explanation, but I trust that we all grasp these
notions well enough to usefully employ them in our discussion.
4. What Calls for an Explanation?
In this section I want to set out a basic abstract model for examining issues of
chance and explanation, which can be applied to a number of more concrete cases,
including the existence of life. The need for explanation arises in a case where there is
some measure of ignorance concerning the process which resulted in the state of affairs
in question. Let us focus on the pebble case again. We can divide up the possible ways
that pebbles can be arranged in a specified area into some appropriate set of elementary
possibilities. For instance we might put a grid over the area and distinguish possible
arrangements according to which cells of the grid are occupied (here I am assuming the
possible positions to be discrete, and hence there are only a finite number of elementary
possibilities; this is a simplifying assumption on which nothing hangs). The state of
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affairs S that we are concerned with (e.g., that the pebbles form a stick-figure) obtains if
and only if some member of a certain subset of the elementary possibilities obtains. Let
us call the hypothesis that the process which resulted in the state of affairs S was just a
matter of chance, the Chance Hypothesis C. This means roughly that the process was
not biased toward some elementary possibilities over others. The crucial point here is
that on the Chance Hypothesis, the elementary possibilities are considered equally
probable.
At least part of what makes a state of affairs call for an explanation is that it is
highly unlikely on the Chance Hypothesis, i.e., that it obtains only if one of a very small
proportion of the elementary possibilities obtains. We are struck by the pattern of
pebbles in Figure 2, partly because it is so improbable that randomly scattered pebbles
would land that way, since a tiny proportion of the possible pebble arrangements form
a stick figure. But now there are two errors to be avoided when thinking about
extremely low probabilities. The first is to suppose that the extreme improbability of a
certain state of affairs coming about by chance, is by itself, a reason to doubt, when we
know that the state of affairs does obtain, that it is the result of chance. It is surprising
how often we read in popular writings by scientists that it is implausible that life arose
by chance, simply because life is an improbable outcome of a chance process. The
mistake may lie in the conflation of two distinct claims: that it is improbable that chance
would result in S, and that it is improbable that S is the result of chance. The first claim
says that the conditional probability P(S I C) is low, while the second says that the
converse P(C I S) is low. The latter, of course, does not follow from the former. For any
blade of grass, the probability that a random swing at a golf ball will result in that blade
being hit is very low, but it is not the case that for whichever blade of grass is hit, it is
improbable that this hitting is the result of a random swing. Extremely low probabilities
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are commonplace--bridge hands are dealt, pebbles are scattered on sidewalks, lotteries
are drawn, and so on. The current phase state of the air just in this room, i.e., the precise
positions and momenta of the molecules in the air, is as improbable as anything we can
imagine, but no one would deny that it was due to chance.
The second mistake in thinking about low probabilities is a reaction to the first. It is
to dismiss the urge for explanation for some unlikely state of affairs, simply on the
grounds that something had to happen, and whatever did happen was bound to be
highly improbable.2 Clearly there are some states of affairs which do call for an
explanation, for which it would be mere foolishness to accept as simply the results of
chance. Our earlier examples of the pebbles falling as in Figures 2 and 3, serve to
illustrate this, but any number of examples can be invented, e.g., a monkey types a
sonnet, one person wins five lotteries in a row, a man spins the dials and opens the safe
within seconds. Some states of affairs do call for an explanation, and the recognition of
those that do plays an important role in scientific investigation.
Under what circumstance then do we have reason to doubt that a state of affairs S is
the result of chance? The rough answer is given to us by Bayes' Theorem: when S is far
more to be expected if the Chance Hypothesis is false. More precisely, the Chance
Hypothesis is rendered unlikely by S, i.e., P(C I S) < 0.5 if and only if
(C1) P(C) P(S I C) < P(-C) P(S I -C)
This condition is both necessary and sufficient for S to render the Chance Hypothesis
improbable and hence call for an explanation. For our purposes however, I think it will
helpful to focus on a weaker, necessary but not sufficient condition, namely that S
disconfirms the Chance Hypothesis, i.e., that P(C I S) < P(C):
2 Gould (1990), Katz (1988) and Scriven (1969) seem to have fallen into this confusion, which Van Inwagen calls
"the most annoyingly obtuse argument in philosophy" (1993:67).
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P(S I C) < P(S I -C)
If C is highly probable on other grounds, then even if S is more probable on the
denial of C, i.e., that the process that resulted in S was biased in some way, the Chance
Hypothesis might still remain the most plausible account of how S came about, and
hence S would not really call for an explanation. So this condition is not sufficient for S's
calling for an explanation. But it is certainly necessary. If S gives us no reason at all to
doubt the Chance Hypothesis, then we can have no reason at all to suppose that there is
an explanation for S.
Now to deny the Chance Hypothesis is to claim that the process which resulted in S
was biased in some way, that there were causal factors present given which some of the
elementary possibilities were more likely than others. In applying condition C2, a
difficulty arises in assigning an appropriate value for P(S I -C). There are any number of
different ways in which the process which led to S might have been biased, some which
(strongly or weakly) favor S and others which disfavor it. The denial of C is simply the
hypothesis that the process was biased in some way or other, so it is not always obvious
how likely S is on this hypothesis. One way to attack this problem is to partition -C into
a set of more specific bias-hypotheses (B1, B2,..., B~) each one giving more details about
the way in which the process was biased. We can then appeal the following principle:
P(S I B) = X, P(S I B,) P(B,)
If the bias-hypotheses B,-Bn are specific enough, there will be less difficulty in assigning
a value to P(S I B,) for any i. But this will shift the problem to assigning a prior
probability distribution over B,-B,. What we need is a partition of -C specific enough to
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(C2)
give some guidance in assigning likelihoods but not so specific as to create difficulties in
assigning prior probabilities.
I think a good place to start is by partitioning -C into the hypotheses of what I will
call teleological and non-teleological biasing. A process such as pebble arranging is
teleologically biased if certain elementary possible outcomes are more likely than others
due to the action of some intelligent agent. By "due to the action" of an agent, of course
I mean to exclude cases in which the outcome is just some unforeseen consequence of
an agent's actions. The idea is that the agent desires that a certain state of affairs obtain
and acts in order to bring it about (or at least to help bring it about). A process is non-
teleologically biased if this biasing is not due in any way to the purposes and actions of
any agent, but rather say, the impersonal laws of nature together with properties of
matter and the structure of certain physical mechanisms.
Corresponding to teleological and non-teleological biasing are teleological and non-
teleological explanations. In general, if a process is teleologically biased in favor of an
actual outcome, then the details of who was responsible and how and why will
constitute a teleological explanation of that state of affairs (and similarly for non-
teleological explanations). There is little doubt that both kinds of explanation are
enormously fruitful in wide variety of cases. We appeal to the purposes and action of
agents not just to explain the behavior of the fleshy blobs we see moving about us, but
in any number of indirect cases also. We appeal to the purposes of an agent to explain
the scrabble letters we find arranged in sentences on the table. Cryptographers, in
deciphering codes, distinguish random noise from signals they suspect were sent as
messages. Teleological explanations are regularly appealed to in detecting various
kinds of fraud such as the rigging of lotteries or elections. One rather neat example
involves copyright fraud. Publishers of maps deliberately include a few minor errors in
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each map. If another publisher produces a map containing the very same errors, we
have excellent reason to suspect that there was plagiarism involved. Errors are to be
expected by chance, and any particular error is about as likely as another. But the
correspondence between errors on the two maps is best explained by supposing that
one was deliberately copied from the other.
These examples involve the actions of familiar contemporary human agents, but we
may also appeal to the agency of beings somewhat removed from us and about whom
we know little. For example, anthropologists may examine very early pieces of rock and
speculate that our early ancestors shaped them for some purpose, such as to be used as
arrow heads or axe blades. In principle we might even appeal to the actions of a kind of
agent the existence of which is initially doubtful. On visiting a distant planet, we might
have reason to conclude that the strange objects that we found there were designed by
extraterrestrial beings. Or even from home, we might receive signals from outer space
which we have reason to think have an intelligent cause. Whether or not we could go
further and appeal to the action of some agent with the power and intelligence to adjust
the fundamental constants of the universe, or assemble enzymes and DN/./RNA
molecules is a question I will speculate on later in the paper.3
Non-teleological explanations are also commonplace. The most obvious kind of
facts which lend themselves to non-teleological explanation are those that involve some
kind of simple regularity. When two parameters which we initially thought to be
causally independent are found to be correlated by some relatively simply function, we
are puzzled and led to suspect that there is an explanation for it.
Let us now look at how the distinction between teleological and non-teleological
biasing may help us discern whether a certain state of affairs calls for an explanation.
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Let BT be the hypothesis that the process that led to S was teleologically biased in some
way, and BN be that it was non-teleologically biased (B, and BN form a partition of the
denial of C; they are inconsistent and their disjunction is equivalent to -C). The
following necessary condition on S's calling for an explanation follows from condition
C2 above:
(C3) P(S I BT) > P(S I C) or P(S I BN) > P(S I C)
In effect, in considering whether S calls for an explanation we must ask whether S was
more to be expected on the assumption that the process from which it resulted was
teleologically biased, than if it was not, or if it was more to be expected given that the
process was non-teleologically biased, than if it was not.
Let's see briefly how this works in the case of the pebbles. The stick-figure
arrangement of Figure 2 is highly improbable on the Chance Hypothesis. But when we
consider its probability on the assumption that the arrangement of pebbles was
teleologically biased, it seems clearly to be much higher. The reason is roughly that the
stick-figure is one of a small class of interesting patterns, and if an agent was going to
go to the trouble of influencing the way the stones are arranged, there is a good chance
that she would arrange them in an interesting way.
In the case of the stones on the beach in Figure 3, on the assumption that the
process which resulted in the stones being arranged as they are was non-teleologically
biased, that they would be arranged roughly in order of size seems more likely than if
they just fell on the beach randomly. This is roughly because of the simplicity of the
pattern that they display. Simple correlations between physical parameters, in this case
3 Some of these examples are taken from Dembski (1998)
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size and position, are just the sort of phenomena we should expect to find on the
assumption that there is some kind of non-teleological biasing at work.
That the pebbles are arranged as in Figure 1 is also highly improbable on the
Chance Hypothesis. But in this case their arrangement seems no more probable on the
denial of this hypothesis. There is nothing to suggest that this outcome is any more
likely given that an agent influenced the arrangement of the pebbles. The arrangement
just doesn't stand out as the kind of pattern that an agent might prefer. Indeed their
arrangement seems less likely on the assumption of teleological biasing. Nor does the
arrangement seem any more likely on the assumption of non-teleological biasing. There
is nothing about this pattern of pebbles which suggests that it was any more likely to
come about given that there was some physical mechanism at work which rendered
some patterns more likely than others. Since the arrangement of pebbles in Figure 1 is
no more likely on the assumption of either teleological or non-teleological biasing than
it is on the Chance Hypothesis, we have no reason at all to doubt the Chance
Hypothesis, and hence the arrangement of pebbles calls for no explanation at all.
5. The Case of Life
Rightly or wrongly, almost everyone who has considered the matter thinks that the
existence of life calls for an explanation. There may be disagreement as to whether the
explanation should appeal to the work of an agent, but almost no one is content with
the view that life is the result of some wildly improbable fluke. Philosophers who have
recently insisted that life calls for some kind of explanation include Daniel Dennett
(1995), John Leslie (1989), Thomas Nagel (1985) 4, Derek Parfit (1998), J. J. C. Smart
(1989), Richard Swinburne (1990), and Peter van Inwagen (1993), although they disagree
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as to what the explanation is or even what the acceptable candidates are. A review of
recent discussions by scientists reveals the same attitude5 I want to examine the reasons
that can be given for such attitudes.
It is said to be extremely improbable for life to come about by chance. There are at
least two sources for this apparent improbability. First, it seems that the existence of life
depends on the extremely fine adjustment of various physical parameters. Had the
boundary conditions in the early seconds of the big bang, and the values of various
fundamental constants differed ever so slightly, we would not have had anything like a
stable universe in which any kind of life could evolve. If we could wind back the
universe to the big bang, our confidence that any kind of life would result should be
zero, or close enough to it.6 Second, the conditions required for a process of natural
selection to get going turn out to be more difficult to meet than had ever been imagined.
Not too long ago it was held that the basic self-replication machinery required for
Darwinian mechanisms to work on might have first come about by a, "chance collision
of molecules" in a prebiotic soup. Few researches in the field today are comfortable
with this idea. Increased understanding of the immense complexity of the molecular
machinery involved, together with a greatly reduced estimate of the time window
available has led scientists to claim that the probability of life (or proto-life, self-
replication systems) arising by chance is absurdly low.
6. Teleological biasing for Life?
If life is so incredibly improbable on the Chance Hypothesis, let us ask whether it is any
more likely on the denial of the Chance Hypothesis, starting first with the possibility of
4 Nagel's concern is not merely the existence of life, but the existence of intelligent life.
5 See Fry (2000) for an overview of scientist's attitudes concerning the origins of life.
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teleological biasing. It might seem to be far more likely. After all, living creatures are
pretty special, far more interesting than a universe containing nothing but hydrogen. If
we were to guess whether a certain big bang was going to turn out a universe
containing living creatures, rather a homogenous cosmic soup, we would be more
inclined to expect the first outcome, if we knew that the physical parameters were being
set by an intelligent agent.
Or so it has seemed to many. The line of reasoning above faces the following
objection which I will call the Preference Problem: In the case of the pebbles arranged
on the sidewalk to form a stick-figure, as with the other cases of teleological biasing
discussed above, we were epistemically well placed to judge what the preferences of an
agent would most likely be. We know roughly how an agent is likely to arrange pebbles
because we know that if there is such a pebble arranger, she is probably a human much
like us, and we have a vast amount of experience to go on to know the kinds of patterns
which might be found interesting or useful to agents like us. But when it comes to the
big bang, or the molecular origins of life on earth, any agent who could have a hand in
such matters would have to be vastly more powerful and intelligent than any thing we
can imagine. Consequently, we can have no clue as to how such a being is likely to act.
We can dream up any number of possible preferences for such an agent, but we have no
principled way of telling that one is more likely than any other. So the emergence of life
is really no more probable on the assumption that some kind of agent adjusted the
fundamental constants, or fiddled with molecules in the primordial soup, than it is on
the assumption that these processes were just random.
Before considering some legitimate responses to this problem, we should first
consider a misguided one. We might just stipulate that the kind of agent we are
6 See Leslie (1989) for more details.
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postulating to explain the existence of life is one that values life and would do what is
necessary for the universe to contain living creatures. The existence of life certainly is
more likely on the assumption of this stronger bias-hypothesis, than on the chance
hypothesis, so it seems that this hypothesis is confirmed by the existence of life. And
since this hypothesis is one in which the processes which resulted in life were biased
this might seem to show us that the existence of life calls for an explanation.
That there is a mistake in this line of reasoning should be clear from the fact that no
matter how the universe had turned out, an argument along these lines would be
available. Whatever the values of the constants were, we could postulate a being whose
intention was to make a universe with just those constants, and argue that since this
hypothesis is confirmed, we have evidence against the Chance Hypothesis. But it
cannot be that the same conclusion could be reached from the way the universe is, no
matter what that way is.
The mistake in the reasoning above may be illustrated by a lottery analogy. Upon
winning the lottery I note that my chances of winning if the lottery was fair were one in
a million, and so are led to suspect that the lottery was rigged (i.e., that there was
teleological biasing in the ticket selection). Clearly I am confused. The assumption that
the lottery was rigged renders it no more likely that I should win, for there are many
people for whom it could be rigged, and it is no more likely to be rigged for me than for
anyone else. It is true that the stronger rigging hypothesis, namely that the lottery was
rigged for me, makes my winning more likely and hence is confirmed by my winning.
But even upon confirmation, this stronger hypothesis can be no more probable than the
weaker hypothesis simply that the lottery was rigged (this follows from the theorem of
probability that if P entails Q, then P(P) • P(Q)). What we have here is a counter-
example to the deceptively appealing principle that if P confirms Q and Q entails R,
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then P confirms R. If confirmation is understood as raising of probability, then my
winning the lottery confirms that the lottery was rigged for me (to some negligible
degree) without confirming that the lottery was rigged. Similarly, although the
hypothesis that there was teleological biasing for life is confirmed to some degree by the
existence of life, it does not follow that life's existence confirms the weaker teleological
biasing hypothesis at all, and hence it does not follow that life's existence gives us any
reason to doubt the Chance Hypothesis. And it is only if life's existence gives us reason
to doubt the Chance Hypothesis, that it calls for an explanation.
7. Some Responses to the Preference Problem
I think the Preference Problem poses a legitimate challenge to anyone who wants to
urge a teleological explanation for the existence of life. But I think it is not as compelling
as at first it might seem for a number of reasons. First, the objection suffers from the
familiar problem that it seems to prove too much. For if we can really have no idea as to
the likely preferences of an agent with the power and wisdom to create life, then there is
nothing in principle that such an agent could do to give us any evidence of his
existence. But this cannot be right. It is not hard to think of hypothetical cases in which
we should be inclined to think there is such a being regardless of our initial skepticism.
Cleanthes makes the following suggestion in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion
Suppose therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder
and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach: Suppose, that this
voice were extended in the same instant over all nations, as space to each nation in
its own language and dialect: Suppose, that the words delivered not only contained
a just sense and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a
benevolent being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment
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concerning the cause of this voice? And must you not instantly ascribe it to some
design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections (if the merit that
appellation) which lie against the system of theism, may also be produced against
this inference (1970: 54)
Another delightful example is suggested by John Leslie (1989). Powerful microscopes
reveal the words "MADE BY GOD" on ever inch of matter we examine in the universe.
In such a case we couldn't help but suspect that some kind of agent was responsible.
But if we can simply have no idea as to the likely preferences of a supernatural agent,
then we have no reason at all to suspect that such an agent was responsible for these
words.
What this example shows is that surely are justified in making some judgments
concerning the likely preferences of such an agent, but whether we should think that
such an agent would have preferences for life is still an open question. The following
thought experiment is interesting to contemplate though. A universe is about to be
created by a rational agent. Which outcome seems more likely: that the world will be
covered with microscopic English sentences, or that it will contain life? It is not at all
obvious that the first outcome is more likely than the second, but we must take it to be
more likely if we take the microscopic English sentences to provide evidence of the
work of a rational agent while the existence of life does not.7
Life might seem like the sort of thing that a rational agent is likely to favor if we
think that it has a certain objective value, which a being of sufficient intelligence is
likely to recognize. It hasn't struck all scientists this way. Here is Stephen J. Gould on
the matter.
7 Why then do the microscopic English sentences intuitively seem to provide more compelling evidence than life?
Perhaps because life is so familiar that we take it for granted while the discovery of "MADE BY GOD" on all matter
would be startling new data. Perhaps also we can't help but think there must be some non-teleological explanation
for life's origin, whereas it seems ludicrous that the microscopic sentences could be explained non-teleologically.
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Suppose the universe were made of little more than diprotons? Would that be bad,
irrational, or unworthy of spirit that moves in many ways its wonders to
perform?...If disembodied mind does exist...must it prefer a universe that will
generate our earth's style of life, rather than a cosmos filled with diprotons? (1990:
184)
Now perhaps being a new father has affected my judgment, but living creatures
strike me as pretty amazing things, especially compared to diprotons, 8 and this attitude
seems importantly different from, say, my preference for vanilla ice-cream. It is odd to
suppose that our concern over the destruction of rainforests and endangered species,
not to mention the destruction of human life or genocide merely reflects our arbitrary
preferences. These concerns are rooted in a conviction that life has some kind of
objective significance, which a being of sufficient intelligence is likely to recognize. In
saying this I am not suggesting that a creator would have an obligation to create life, or
that it would be bad or irrational not to. The point is only that our deepest concerns
reflect a conviction that life is something special, something which would stand out
among the options that a creator would have to choose from.9
Be that as it may, it is worth noting that the case that life's existence is more likely
given teleological biasing than by chance need not lean very heavily on prior
convictions about what an agent is likely to value. Perhaps I can illustrate the point here
by an analogy of a ball making machine. The machine has a couple of dozen dials with
ten notches, and produces plastic balls of various, colors, sizes, shapes, hardnesses and
weights, depending on the settings of the dials. Our question is, when a green ball is
produced, do we have any reason to suspect that the dials were adjusted on purpose,
8 Diprotons are the hypothetical result of the bonding of hydrogen nuclei, which according to Freeman Dyson
(1979) whose teleological argument Gould is responding to, would have populated the universe if the weak nuclear
force had been the slightest bit stronger.
9 Note also that what is at issue is not "our earth's style of life" but any possible kind of life at all.
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rather than just spun at random? At first it might seem obvious that we do not, for there
is nothing intrinsically valuable about the color green. If an agent adjusting the dials
had any color preference at all, we should no more expect her to prefer green than any
other color.
But now let's suppose that the way the machine works is that only one of the
trillion trillion possible dial settings produces a green ball. Now intuitively we do have
reason to suspect that the dials were deliberately adjusted. Not only does this judgment
not depend on the assumption that an agent would prefer green, it is reasonable even
with the opposite assumption. Suppose Jane set the dials, but we don't know whether
she adjusted them deliberately or just spun them at random. Jane is color blind, but she
does have some friends who like white balls. So if Jane purposely adjusted the dials,
color preferences would most likely have no influence on her choice of settings, but if
they do, she will most likely choose to make a white ball. Still, when a green ball pops
out, we have reason to suspect that Jane adjusted the dials on purpose. The reason is
that if the dials were spun at random, the chance of getting a green ball is 10 -24, but on
any reasonable estimate, Jane's likelihood of adjusting the dials to get a green ball is
much higher than that, even it is quite low. In order to claim that the production of a
green ball provides no evidence that Jane purposely set the dials, we would have to
insist that it is extremely unlikely that she would have any reason to want a green ball,
that the chances of this are one in a trillion trillion.
The case of life in the universe seems somewhat similar. What is important here is
the starkness of the alternatives. According to the standard story, in the space of
possible outcomes of a big bang, the tiniest region consists of universes capable of
sustaining life, while large regions consist of universes which re-collapse within
seconds, or contain nothing but hydrogen, or nothing but black holes, and so on. To
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deny that life is more probable given teleological biasing than on chance, it is not
sufficient to complain that we have no reason to suppose that an agent would favor life
over these other possibilities. We must insist that it is extremely unlikely that an agent
would have any motive at all to create a life-permitting universe. But it is hard to
imagine why someone would think this.
So it seems that the Preference Problem is not a devastating objection to the claim
that the existence of life calls for an explanation. It can be argued that life is more to be
expected given teleological biasing than on the Chance Hypothesis. Of course it does
not follow that life does call for an explanation. To establish that we need to show that it
is unlikely that life arose by chance, and this involves us in further controversies over
the prior probability of the Chance and teleological biasing hypotheses, and these are
beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Non-teleological Biasing for Life?
Suppose we are skeptical of teleological biasing, as most of the scientific and
philosophical community is, and so do not see at as a serious alternative to the Chance
Hypothesis. Is there any other reason to doubt the Chance Hypothesis, which involves
only non-teleological speculations? That is, is life more to be expected on the
assumption that the processes from which it resulted were non-teleologically biased,
than on the Chance Hypothesis? Let's start with the cosmological case. Some
philosophers (e.g., Smart (1989)) who have been struck by the so-called fine-tuning of
the universe for life, have thought that the solution to this puzzle may lie in the
discovery of more fundamental laws which constrain the values of the constants on
which the existence of life depends. Now some scientists apparently think that we
should expect to discover such laws entirely independently of the puzzle about life.
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That is, even if it was known that just about any way the big bang turned out could
have supported life, they would still find it dissatisfying that there are so many features
of the universe which take arbitrary values, ones which cannot be deduced from a
general theory. They think that we should expect to find some very simple theory with
few free parameters from which everything else can be deduced. I am not sure whether
such an attitude is justified, but this is not the view that concerns me here. What
interests me are those that see the fact that the actual values of the fundamental
constants (or ones close to them) are necessary for JA, as a motivation for the search for
more fundamental laws.
It strikes me that while the Preference Problem is less than compelling against the
suggestion of teleological biasing, it is devastating against this suggestion. Let us
suppose that there does exist some set of more fundamental laws which constrain the
physical constants to some narrow range of values. There seems to be no reason to
suppose that these laws would constrain the constants to some particular set of values
over any others. So the probability that life will exist given that there are more
fundamental laws, is no greater than on the Chance Hypothesis. Certainly if we just
focus on the values of the constants themselves, there is nothing to about the actual
values which makes them stand out as the kind of values that fundamental laws are
likely favor. Does the fact that certain values are necessary for life make them more
likely to be favored by laws? I can't imagine why anyone would think so. While there is
at least room to argue that a rational agent is likely to bias the constants in order to
allow for the evolution of life, to suppose that impersonal physical laws are likely to
constrain the constants in this way seems to be based on some kind of confused
anthropomorphism. What makes the particular narrow range in which the actual values
of the physical constants happen to fall salient is that just that they permit the existence
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of something that strikes us as special or interesting or valuable, namely life. Even if this
value we attach to life is something objective, whether it be moral or aesthetic, or
whatever, it could only have influence on the behavior of an agent. Blind physical laws
are no more naturally drawn toward states of affairs with value than blind chance is.
It will not help of course, to appeal not merely to the hypothesis that there are some
fundamental laws which constrain the constants to some values, but to the stronger
hypothesis that they are constrained to their actual values, or at least to the range of
values necessary for life. This commits the same mistake as the response to the
Preference Problem with respect to teleological biasing considered above. No matter
how the big bang turned out, we could postulate a set of laws which constrain the
values of the constants to their actual values. Such a hypothesis would be confirmed to
some negligible degree, but the hypothesis that there are any laws at all governing the
values of the constants need not be confirmed. And if it is not, and we have no evidence
of any other kind of biasing, then we have no reason to doubt that life came about by
chance.
What can seem rather surprising, is that the same conclusions seem to apply to the
case of the molecular origins of life. Here I venture into areas in which I have little
expertise, but I think we can abstract from the technical details to examine the
underlying reasoning. Of all the ways that molecules can fall together by chance, an
extraordinarily small proportion constitute the kind of self-replication machinery
required for a process of natural selection to get going. So the chance of life arising by
chance, even given the basic organic chemical ingredients and a hospitable
environment, is said to be incredibly low. This calculation of low probability is based on
a flat probability distribution over a large class of possible ways that amino acids and
the like could combine. Now let's suppose that the process by which these complex
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molecules arose was not just a matter of chance, but rather was (non-teleologically)
biased towards certain molecular configurations. Are living or life-producing molecules
more likely to appear on this assumption? I am unable to see any reason to think so. We
can think up any number of ways that the process could be biased. As in the
cosmological case, what makes certain molecular configurations stand out from the
multitude of possibilities is that they are capable of developing into something which
strikes us as pretty marvelous, namely a world of living creatures. But there is no
conceivable reason that blind forces of nature should be biased toward the marvelous.
The reason that this conclusion surprising is that whereas the search for laws to
constrain the physical constants is not widespread (most cosmologists find Multiple-
Universe solutions more hopeful),'1 the search for a non-teleological explanation for the
molecular origins of life is a very active research program. The following, I believe, is a
fair representation of the attitudes of most scientists working on the origin of life in the
last few decades:
We now know that the probability of life arising by chance is far too low to be
plausible, hence there must be some deeper explanation which we are yet to
discover, given which the origin of life is at least reasonably likely. Perhaps we
have little idea yet what form this explanation will take-although of course it
will not involve teleology; this is would be a desperate last resort, or simply not
an option at all-but we every reason to look for an explanation, for we have
every reason to think there is one.
Iris Fry (1995) argues that although the disagreements among origin of life theorists run
very deep, relating to the most basic features of the models they propose, the view
sketched above is a fundamental unifying assumption, an assumption which Fry
enthusiastically endorses. Some researchers in the field are even more optimistic of
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course. They believe that they have already found the explanation, or at least have a
good head start on it. But their commitment to the thesis above is epistemically more
basic, in the sense that it motivated their research in the first place and even if their
theories were shown to be false, they would retain this basic assumption."
There is a small but well known group of detractors, whom Fry calls the "Almost
Miracle Camp" including Crick (1981), Mayr (1982), and Monod (1974), who are content
with the idea that life arose by chance, with no intelligent guidance, even if the
probability of this happening is extremely low.'- According to Crick "the origin of life
appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would
have had to been satisfied to get it going" (p. 88); the emergence of life was nevertheless
a "happy accident" (p. 14). According to Mayr, "a full realization of the near
impossibility of an origin of life brings home the point of how improbable this event
was." (p. 45). Monod famously claimed that although the probability of life arising by
chance was "virtually zero...our number came up in the Monte Carlo game" (p. 137).
Life, as Monod puts it, is "chance caught on a wing" (p. 78), i.e., although natural
selection took over early to produce the diversity of life, its origin was nothing but an
incredibly improbable fluke.
The majority of theorists however clearly define their work in opposition to this
view. The more common attitude is summed up neatly by J. D. Bernmal,
[TIhe question, could life have originated by a chance occurrence of atoms,
clearly leads to a negative answer. This answer, combined with the knowledge
10 1 discuss these in White (2000).
i Robert Shapiro (1986) is the staunchest critic of all current origin of life theories. But he too finds it reasonable to
hold out hope for a non-teleological explanation.
12 Fry's two complaints against the "Alnmost Miracle Camp" are first that it puts an end to scientific research into
i fe's origtns and second that it leaves the way open to the teleological suggestions of Hoyle and Wickramas inghe
(1981).
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that life is actually here, leads to the conclusion that some sequences other than
chance occurrences must have led to we appearances of life. (quoted in Fry 2000:
153)
According to Christian De Duve,
unless one adopts a creationist view...life arose through the succession of
an enormous number of small steps, almost each of which, given the
condition at the time had a very high probability of happening...the
alternative amounts to a miracle...were [the emergence of life] not an
obligatory manifestation of the combinatorial properties of matter, it
could not possibly have arisen naturally. (1991: 217)
If what I have argued is correct, this approach to the issue is misguided. Unless we
are inclined to adopt a teleological explanation, there is no reason to expect there is an
explanation for life's emergence, and we should join Francis Crick and company in
seeing life as a "happy accident".
9. A Clarification
Perhaps I should make a few comments to clarify the case that I have been making
here. Returning to the cosmological case, suppose someone proposes as a fundamental
law of nature something like the following: "Necessarily, the physical constants must
take values in the range..."and just plugs in the those values necessary for a life-
permitting universe. When asked what evidence there was for this theory, his only
reply is that the theory makes the existence of life less of a miracle. Such a proposal
should not be taken seriously, for reasons discussed earlier. The problem with the
theory proposed above is that the laws involve various free parameters which are just
set to the very values we need for life. So in a sense, the law inherits the apparent
arbitrariness and improbability of that which it seeks to explain. Of all the possible laws
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of this form, the proposed law seems no more likely to be true than any law which
constrained the values of the constants to a similarly small range.
But no one has, to my knowledge, made such a proposal, and my objections are
intended to cover more than just this straw-man. The suggestions of those that
anticipate more fundamental laws to explain life are more subtle. What would be more
credible is if a theory were proposed which had life-permitting constants as a
consequence (or at least rendered them probable), but this theory had some ildependent
motivation. The theory might for instance be supported by further empirical evidence
or considerations of simplicity. If a theory which entailed life permitting values of the
constants had some independent support which boosted its antecedent probability even
a little bit above the numerous possible theories which entail different values, such a
theory might be confirmed to a significant degree by the existence of life. Nothing that I
have argued should suggest that couldn't be, or even that there haven't been theoretical
advances which give us reason to suppose that life was the probable outcome of a non-
teleological process. As it happens, the balance of evidence seems to have shifted away
form such a view in the last few decades. On the one hand, there may have been some
developments in cosmology and biology which make life seem less improbable. But
overall, we have discovered an ever increasing number and diversity of conditions that
must be met for life to exist, making life seem far less probable. I have no prediction to
offer about how the situation will look in the future.
What I am challenging, is the view that whether or not we have yet come up with a
plausible and well motivated explanation for the origin of life, we have every reason to
expect that there is one. We could illustrate the idea with the pebbles of Figure 1 again.
Suppose someone attempted to explain the pebble arrangement by suggesting that
there were very strong magnets under the ground at the very points where the pebbles
90
lie. So the pebbles, which contain traces of iron, couldn't help but be pulled into their
present positions as they were scattered by the skidding car wheel. This suggestion
would be analogous to the law proposed above to explain the life-permitting physical
constants, and would be frivolous for the same reason. However, it is not entirely far
fetched that there could be some simpler, less ad hoc well motivated theory which
surprisingly had the consequence that the pebbles were likely to land in that pattern,
even if we can't think of one. If someone proposed such a theory it should be taken
seriously. But suppose someone claimed that although we do not know of such an
explanation, we have reason to believe that there is one. We have reason, that is, to take
seriously the question 'Why did the pebble fall in this pattern?' and have reason to
think when all the facts are in we will see that this arrangement of pebbles was really to
be expected. This would be analogous to the view of many scientists concerning the
origin of life, and is what I also take to be misguided.
10. Complexity
Both my own intuitions and a respect for science lead me to doubt my conclusion,
so I should at least attempt to find something wrong with it. The most promising line of
response, I suspect, is to claim that it is not strictly speaking life which calls for the
explanation, but some other phenomenon which necessary goes along with life. The
catch word in discussions of the origin of life is 'complexity' or 'organized complexity'.
What has struck scientists with such awe, is that even the very simplest cell is an
enormously complicated piece of machinery, more intricate and complex than any
machine made by humans. It might seem that this alone is what stands in need of
explanation, whether or not the machinery happens to be life like.
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Just what it means for something to be complex in the relevant sense is rarely
explained, but it is generally acknowledged that the idea is well captured by Fred
Hoyle's (1981) suggestion that the random assembly of the simplest living system
would be like a tornado blowing through a junkyard and assembling a Boeing /47.
Obviously part of what makes something complex is that it has a heterogeneous
structure, being made up of very many parts of various shapes and sizes. But the pile of
747 parts we would expect to see after the tornado struck and bulldozers gathered the
debris meets this condition also. We should also note that the probability that the 747
parts should be randomly assembled into a jumbled pile of some very specific shape
and structure is just as improbable as their being assembled into a plane. What then
distinguishes the pile of 747 parts from the 747? The idea seems to be what Hume (1970)
referred to as "the curious adapting of means to ends" (p. 34) Like a living system, the
plane consists of very many parts working intricately together to perform a function,
namely flying. The parts have to be very carefully arranged for this to work; if any one
part had been in the wrong position, then the plane couldn't perform its function. The
pile of plane parts on the other hand, don't do anything but sit there, or topple over if
you push them enough. And you don't need a very precise arrangement of parts to do
that.
But on a closer look, this apparent difference is not so deep. We could define a very
specific functional property that the plane has, e.g., the pile is such that when this part
is pulled in precisely this direction this far, then the pile will topple into this ver:y
structure. This functional property requires for its instantiation an extremely precise
arrangement of parts; shift one part and the pile will not topple in exactly the same way.
Call a pile of plane parts which has this functional property a "schmane" What planes
and schmanes have in common is that the probability that tornado strewn plane parts
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would assemble either one is extremely low. Why then are we so resistant to the idea
that a tornado could assemble the parts into a plane, but have no trouble supposing that
it could produce schmane? The answer should be that the tornado is just as likely to
produce either, it is just that only the plane is more likely to result if there was more
than just chance operating. But now we must return to the question of whether it is the
assumption of teleological or non-teleological biasing which renders this outcome more
probable. Certainly the plane might seem more likely on the assumption that an agent
influenced the arrangement of the parts (that is why if we found one on a distant planet
we would conclude that extraterrestrials had built it). But I can see no reason to suppose
that on the assumption of non-teleological biasing, a plane is any more likely than a
schmane. Any considerations which make planes stand out as special as compared to
schmanes, are teleologically related, the intuitions have to do with what we think an
agent is likely to do. We seem to be in the same situation with respect to the simplest
self-replicating molecules. Such a molecule has the remarkable property that it can lead
by natural selection to the evolution of an enormous diversity of life forms. It turns out
that the delicate adjustment of parts required to build such a molecule is not unlike
what is required to build a plane, making it extremely improbable that chance would
produce such a thing. But I can see no reason why what DeDuve calls the
"combinatorial properties of matter", if they favor particular molecular configurations,
should favor those with the potential to create the diversity of life.
11. Two More Analogies and a Conclusion
The following two stories Nill help sum up the case I have been making here. We're
playing bridge and Fred deals himself a hand of thirteen spades and the rest of us
mediocre hands. This might strike us as a little suspicious, leading us to suspect that the
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dealing wvas biased in some way. Just how strong a reason if any we have to suspect
that an agent such as Fred biased the dealing may be controversial, depending on
various factors such as how strong an incentive he would have given the stakes and
how difficult it would be to pull it off. So it is perhaps not clear whether the hands that
were dealt call for an explanation. But what would be wrong-headed is to say:
Yes I doubt that those hands were dealt by an ordinary random shuffling, where
each card has an equal chance of landing in any position in the pack. But rather
than suspecting Fred or any other agent of foul play (since Fred couldn't and
wouldn't do it, and I don't believe in supernatural agents), there is probably an
explanation involving impersonal physical mechanisms. Perhaps there are
attractive forces between the cards which cause them to cluster in certain
configurations during a normal shuffling, and these tend to favor all spades
being dealt to the dealer.
The problem with this suggestion is not the implausibility of the theory; we can
pretend that it has as much initial plausibility as we like (perhaps we are playing with a
unusual set of cards whose properties are largely unknown to us). The problem is that
on the assumption that there are such card-clustering forces, they are no more likely to
favor certain orderings over any others (unless we suspect that they are more likely to
have been designed to cluster in certain ways). So the fact that Fred was dealt all spades
gives us no reason to suspect that such a theory is correct, or indeed any theory which
does not involve agency. The point is that the only thing that makes a hand of spades
salient, and stand out among the possible hands as calling for an explanation, is that the
hand is one that may have significance for a rational agent. Fred's lucky hand should
therefore either suggest that there is some teleological explanation, or be dismissed as a
"happy accident".
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Here is the second story. A meteorite shower results in millions of little rocks
arranged in the Australian desert to form a proof of Goldbach's Conjecture. I doubt that
anyone in this case would be comfortable with saying that the rocks just fell this way by
chance. Whatever our prior convictions, we couldn't help but suspect that an agent
somehow directed the course of the rocks, even if we can't imagine how. The following
response however, would be confused:
Yes, there is no doubt that this didn't just happen by chance alone. The
probability of randomly falling rocks landing in such a meaningful pattern is just
too low! But let's not jump to any conclusions about intelligent agency. This
puzzling state of affairs should motivate a new scientific research program to
discover the non-random physical mechanisms which govern the way rocks fall
from space, given the appropriate conditions. We might not have the answer yet,
and the current suggestions may be only sketchy, but we have every reason to
expect to find a non-teleological explanation.
A difference between the two stories is that in the first, it is unclear whether the
data call for an explanation at all, whereas in the second they clearly do. Whether the
case of life's existence is closer to the first or the second story in this respect is not a
question that I have tried to settle in this paper. What I believe both stories have in
common with the case of life, is that we have a state of affairs which is puzzling only to
the extent that it seems to be the sort of thing that an agent might bring about. Finding it
pu.zling, researchers are then motivated to seek explanations which make no appeal to
teleology. The reasoning in the case of life doesn't seem as confused as in the stories, but
I've been led to the conclusion that it is.
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